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Comments
Tension on the High Seas of Transnational Securities
Fraud: Broadening the Scope of United States
Jurisdiction
I. INTRODUCTION

Business activities pertaining to the offer, sale, or purchase of
securities' increasingly transpire in two or more countries. 2 On the
one hand, this globalization of the securities markets3 has a beneficial
effect because it promises more efficient securities markets as well as
increased diversification of investment risks.4 On the other hand,
globalization places a heavier burden upon countries to police improper
investment activity because the increase in "transnational" securities
transactions produces greater opportunity to commit securities fraud.5
Illegal activities causing securities fraud can span two or more

1. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") broadly defines the term
"security" to include notes, stocks, bonds, debentures, and investment contracts. See 15
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (West 1997 & Supp. 1999). However, "cases have not been entirely
clear on the proper method of analysis for determining when an instrument is a
,security."' Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 688 (1985). For an
extensive discussion of the definition of the term "security," see 2 Louis Loss & JOEL
SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION

923-1138.19 (3d ed. rev. 1999).

2. See Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1987). When
Congress initially enacted the federal securities laws in the 1930s, "[tfhe web of
international connections in the securities market was . . . not nearly as extensive or
complex as it has become." Id.
3. Globalization of securities markets occurs as securities transactions involve
issuers of different nationalities, transactions are executed in more than one country, or
securities purchasers and sellers residing in more than one country. See Merritt B. Fox,
Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate Whom, 95 MICH. L.
REV. 2498, 2502 (1997).
4. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, National Laws, International Money:
Regulation in a Global Capital Market, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1855, 1856 (1997).
5. See id. at 1857; see also infra notes 29-44 and accompanying text (discussing the
basic elements of securities fraud). Transnational law includes, "all law which regulates
actions or events that transcend national frontiers." PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL
LAW 2 (1956). The United States, however, is limited in its ability to adjudicate issues
of transnational law by both the Constitution and international principles of
sovereignty. See id. at 35; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (giving United States courts the
authority to decide cases that arise under the "Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and treaties made ... under their Authority").
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continents, 6 and litigants can include foreign nationals and corporations.7 The varieties of transnational securities fraud are limitless, and
only the facts of each particular case lead to the characterization of a
given transaction as "transnational." 8
Despite the usual presumption against the extraterritorial application
of United States laws,9 in certain instances, federal courts do have
subject matter jurisdiction over cases involving transnational securities
fraud.10 Under the so-called "effects" approach, a federal court has
jurisdiction in a transnational securities fraud case if the alleged fraud
had a negative effect on United States investors or securities markets."
Even if there is no adverse effect on American investors or securities
markets, however, a United States court may still have jurisdiction if2
sufficient conduct pertaining to the fraud occurs in the United States.
When a plaintiff alleges that only some of a defendant's activities
pertaining to the fraud occurred in the United States, a question arises
as to whether the conduct is extensive enough to allow a United States
federal court to preside over the case. 13
The jurisdictional provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
("Exchange Act") and its legislative history are silent concerning the
scope of its application to securities transactions that traverse national
6. See SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 111 (3d Cir. 1977).
7. See Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421, 422 (9th Cir. 1983).
8. See infra Part III (discussing the varying facts of transnational securities fraud
cases).
9. See infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text (discussing the presumption against
applying United States laws extraterritorially).
10. See infra notes 88-123 and accompanying text (discussing instances in which
courts granted subject matter jurisdiction using an effects approach or a conduct
approach analysis).
11. See infra notes 88-108 and accompanying text (discussing the elements and the
application of the effects approach).
12. See infra notes 109-123 and accompanying text (discussing generally the conduct
approach).
13. See Robinson v. TCI/US W. Cable Communications Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 904 (5th
Cir. 1997) (remarking that the plaintiff's allegations required the court "to confront the
rather nebulous issue of the extent to which the American securities laws may be applied
extraterritorially"). Also at issue is whether a United States court will have personal
jurisdiction over the litigants and whether a United States court is the proper forum in a
particular case. See also , Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d
1326, 1339-44 (2d Cir. 1972) (discussing personal jurisdiction, venue, and forum non
conveniens in the context of a transnational securities fraud case); see, e.g., DAVID
EPSTEIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION:

A GUIDE TO JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND

STRATEGY §§ 5.06, 6.01-.09 (3d ed. 1998) (discussing generally personal jurisdiction
and forum issues in transnational litigation). This article, however, is restricted to the
issue of whether a United States court has subject matter jurisdiction in a transnational
securities fraud case.
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boundaries.' 4 Every circuit addressing the issue has acknowledged
instances and developed guidelines to determine when a United States
court has subject matter jurisdiction over a transnational securities
transaction. 5 There is sharp disagreement among the circuit courts,
however, about the precise degree of domestic conduct that16 a plaintiff
must prove to allow a federal court to exercise jurisdiction.
The Seventh Circuit has recognized three different approaches that
United States courts use to determine whether they have jurisdiction in
a transnational securities fraud case.17 Under the first approach, the
restrictive conduct approach, a plaintiff must prove that conduct
satisfied all of the elements of a prima facie securities fraud claim. 8
Under the second approach, the broader conduct approach, a plaintiff
merely has to prove that some conduct pertaining to the fraud occurred
in the United States.' 9 Under the third approach, the balancing
conduct approach, a plaintiff must prove that the conduct in the United
States was not merely preparatory and that the conduct directly caused
the loss the plaintiff alleged.2° These three approaches have emerged
to quantify the amount of authority Congress intended to bestow upon
the judiciary in transnational fraud cases.2 '
This Comment uses the threefold distinction proposed by the
Seventh Circuit to examine the split among the circuit courts regarding
the proper scope and application of the conduct approach to
14. See Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 663-64 (7th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 890 (1999) (stating that Congress provided "little meaningful
guidance on the issue"). One commentator suggests, however, that the legislative
history of the federal securities laws provides more guidance than courts acknowledge.
See Margaret V. Sachs, The International Reach of Rule lOb-5: The Myth of
Congressional Silence, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 677, 694-99 (1990) [hereinafter
The InternationalReach of Rule lOb-5] (arguing against the extraterritorial application
of federal securities laws).
15. See Kauthar, 149 F.3d at 666-67; Europe and Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A.
v. Banque Paribas London, 147 F.3d 118, 127-31 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
1029 (1999); Robinson, 117 F.3d at 906-07; Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824
F.2d 27, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421, 424-25 (9th
Cir. 1983); Continental Grain (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409,
415-21 (8th Cir. 1979); SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 112-15 (3d Cir. 1977).
16. See Kauthar, 149 F.3d at 665-66; Robinson, 117 F.3d at 905-06; Zoelsch, 824
F.2d at 30-31; Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041, 1046 n.6 (2d Cir. 1983).
17. See Kauthar, 149 F.3d at 665-66.
18. See infra notes 133-49 and accompanying text (discussing the restrictive conduct
approach).
19. See infra notes 150-213 and accompanying text (discussing the broader conduct
approach).
20. See infra notes 214-305 and accompanying text (discussing the balancing
conduct approach).
21. See Kauthar, 149 F.3d at 665.
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transnational securities fraud cases. This Comment begins by
describing the policies of the Exchange Act and the basic elements of
securities fraud.22 Subsequently, this Comment explains the principles
underlying the extension of jurisdiction beyond domestic borders as
well as the basic policies supporting the application of national
securities laws to transnational transactions. 23 This Comment then
discusses the three different analyses of the conduct approach that
courts have adopted to determine the scope of their subject matter
jurisdiction in transnational securities fraud cases. 24 Next, this
Comment critically analyzes recent developments in the debate
concerning subject matter jurisdiction over transnational securities
cases. Finally, this Comment proposes that courts adopt a broader
approach to determining whether they have subject matter jurisdiction
over a particular transnational fraud case to provide the clearest
procedural standards and to best serve the remedial policies of federal
securities legislation.26
H1. BACKGROUND

Before examining the principles of federal jurisdiction that justify
the extraterritorial application of the Exchange Act's antifraud
provisions," it is important to understand the basic policies underlying
facie
the federal securities laws as well as the elements of a prima
28
securities fraud case under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.
A. Securities Fraud
Congress enacted the Exchange Act to regulate and control
Congress decided that such
secondary trading of securities.
regulation was necessary to protect interstate commerce and to
maintain "fair and honest markets" for securities transactions." The

22. See infra Part II.A.
23. See infra Part II.B-D.
24. See infra Part II.

25. See infra Part IV.
26. See infra Part V.
27. See infra Part II.D (discussing the jurisdictional provisions of the Exchange Act).
28. See infra Part II.A (discussing securities fraud).
29. See 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1994). The Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act") deals
with the initial process of distributing securities conducted by the issuer. See 1 Loss &
SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 225 (3d ed. 1998). In contrast, the Exchange Act regulates
secondary trading such as trading of securities during the post-distribution period. See
id. at 226.
30. See 15 U.S.C. § 78b.
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Exchange Act, as remedial legislation, 3' achievesits purpose through
three primary mechanisms. First, the federal securities laws
implement a philosophy of mandatory full disclosure that requires
market participants to reveal material information pertaining to the
securities they are offering, selling, or purchasing.3 2 Second, the
federal securities laws maintain market integrity by protecting investors
from fraud.3 3 Finally, the securities laws "promote ethical standards
of honesty and fair dealing" by market participants through the
imposition of civil liabilities. 4
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act is a catch-all antifraud
provision.35 Section 10(b) prohibits anyone from using "any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in the sale or
purchase of securities.3 6 Section 10(b), however, is not self-operative
because Congress delegated authority to implement the statute to the
Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC").37 The SEC has authority

under Section 10(b) to issue rules and regulations that it deems
"necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors."38 Using this congressionally delegated authority, the SEC
issued Rule lOb-5, which, like Section 10(b), employed very broad
antifraud language.3 9
31. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967). Generally, "remedial
legislation should be construed broadly to effectuate its purposes." Id.
32. See id. Congress adopted a mandatory disclosure policy due to pervasive
securities fraud prior to the adoption of the federal securities laws. See 1 Loss &
SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 193 (3d ed. 1998). Furthermore, the state securities laws were
ineffective in preventing and punishing securities fraud. See id. at 198.
33. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976).
34. Id.
35. See id. at 203; see also 7 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 3411 (3d ed. 1991)
(describing Section 10(b) as an "omnibus" provision). Section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person . .. by the use of any means .. . of
interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange
To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary and
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
37. See 7 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 3411-12 (3d ed. 1991).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
39. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998). Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
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Although Rule lOb-5 does not provide for an express private right
of action to injured investors, courts have found that injured investors
40
have an implied private right of action in some circumstances.
Generally, the situations in which courts recognize a cause of action
involve the misrepresentation or omission of corporate information,4'
insider trading,42 or intentional manipulation.43 A plaintiff suing under
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 has the burden of proving that a
defendant "1) made a misstatement or omission, 2) of material fact, 3)
with scienter [knowledge], 4) in connection with the purchase or sale
of securities, 5) upon which the plaintiff relied, and 6) that reliance
proximately caused the plaintiff's injury."'
B. FederalSubject Matter Jurisdiction

Subject matter jurisdiction is the power of a court to rule on a
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
40. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976); see also 2 THOMAS
LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 63 (2d ed. 1990) (explaining that the

Supreme Court has recognized a private right of action under Rule lOb-5 where the
plaintiff is a buyer or seller of securities, the defendant acted with scienter, and the
conduct was deceptive).
41. See, e.g., Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., 51 F.3d 1329, 1333 (7th Cir. 1995)
(recognizing that there is a Rule lob-5 cause of action against a corporation if the
corporation made overly optimistic corporate projections in bad faith or without a
reasonable basis); In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 268 (2d Cir. 1993)
(holding that corporations have a duty to disclose "whenever secret information renders
prior public statements materially misleading").
42. See, e.g., United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-52 (1997). Insider
trading occurs when a corporate insider buys or sells his corporation's securities using
material, nonpublic information. See id. For an extensive discussion of insider trading,
see 7 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 3448-3545 (3d ed. 1991) and 8 Loss &
SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 3547-3937 (3d ed. 1991).
43. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 214 (holding that manipulation involves
intentional wrongdoing rather than negligent conduct).
44. Stransky, 51 F.3d at 1331 (citing In re Phillips Petroleum Sec. Litig., 881 F.2d
1236, 1244 (3d Cir. 1989)). Plaintiffs must have standing to sue under Rule lob-5. See
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754-55 (1975) (holding that
only purchasers and sellers of securities have standing to sue under Rule lOb-5); see also
HAZEN, supra note 40, at 70-80 (discussing standing to sue under Rule lOb-5).
Furthermore, plaintiffs must plead allegations of securities fraud with particularity. See
FED. R. CIv. P. 9(b); see also HAZEN, supra note 40, at 66-70 (discussing the requirement
of pleading securities fraud with particularity).
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plaintiff's claim.4 5 In order for a party to obtain an enforceable
judgment, the court before which a case appears must have valid
authority to hear the case.4 6 Thus, there must be sufficient facts to
support subject matter jurisdiction before a court can adjudicate a
claim.47 If, following a factual analysis, a court determines that it
lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a case, the court must dismiss the
claim. 4 8 Generally, a plaintiff must present sufficient jurisdictional
facts in the complaint to establish that the court is competent to hear the
case. 49 The presence of proper federal jurisdiction, however, is
predicated on the type of claim before the court, not on the merits of
the claim.5°
Article III of the United States Constitution defines the scope of
federal judicial power by restricting the types of cases and
controversies that federal courts may hear. 1 Furthermore, under the

45. See 5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1350 (2d ed. 1990 & Supp. 1998).
46. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 11 (1982) ("A judgment may properly
be rendered against a party only if the court has authority to adjudicate the type of
controversy involved in the action.").
47. See 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 45, § 1063; see also EPSTEIN ET AL., supra
note 13, § 5.02 (stating that an analysis of United States jurisdiction begins with an
analysis of subject matter jurisdiction).
48. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). "Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties
or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall
dismiss the action." Id. at 12(h)(3); see also 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 45, §
1350 (discussing motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
49. See FED. R. CIv. P. 8(a)(1); see also 13 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 45, § 3522
("[Tihe facts showing the existence of jurisdiction must be affirmatively alleged in the
complaint."). A court may, however, dismiss a case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction on the basis of (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint plus undisputed
facts; or (3) the complaint plus undisputed facts and facts resolved by the court. See
Robinson v. TCI/US W. Communications Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 904 (5th Cir. 1997).
50. See 13 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 45, § 3522. Even if a claim fails on its
merits, a federal court may still have subject matter jurisdiction to hear and rule on the
claim. See id.
5 1. See 15 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 100.02 (3d ed.
1998); see also Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1987)
(agreeing that "the jurisdictional limits that Art. III of the Constitution places on the
federal courts relate to subject-matter jurisdiction only"); 13 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra
note 45, § 3521 (discussing the "Constitutional Basis of the Judicial Power of the
Federal Courts"). Article III provides, "[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may . . .
establish." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Further, the Supreme Court has original
jurisdiction in "all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of
the United States, and Treaties made." Id. § 2. In all such cases, "the supreme Court
shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such exceptions . . . as
the Congress shall make." Id.
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doctrine of federalism,52 the Constitution gives Congress the power to
53
create the lower federal courts as Congress deems necessary.
Congress also has the power to limit or expand the jurisdiction of the
lower courts.5 4 Jurisdiction, however, cannot exceed the limits
imposed upon the judiciary by the Constitution." Thus, the federal
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction because both the Constitution
and Congress restrict the types of cases and controversies that federal
courts are competent to decide.56
Congress has expressly granted lower federal courts with jurisdiction in two types of cases: those "arising under" a federal question57
and diversity of citizenship cases.58 In particular, Congress
specifically granted jurisdiction to the federal judiciary to decide cases
arising under the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act")5 9 and the
52. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 11 cmt. a (1982) (noting that
restrictions on the jurisdiction of federal courts are "a consequence of the legal structure
of American federalism"). The doctrine of federalism holds that the authority of the
federal government cannot exceed what the Constitution allows. See id.
53. See 15 MOORE ET AL., supra note 51, 100.20[1].
100.20[2]. Congress also has the constitutional authority to vest
54. See id.
exclusive jurisdiction in the federal judiciary, thereby precluding state courts from
exercising jurisdiction over certain cases. See The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411,
428-29 (1866) (citing Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816)).
100.20; see also 13 WRIGHT & MILLER,
55. See 15 MOORE ET AL., supra note 51,
supra note 45, § 3521. In a terse opinion on diversity jurisdiction, Chief Justice
Marshall wrote, "[t]urn to the article of the constitution of the United States, for the
statute cannot extend the jurisdiction beyond the limits of the constitution." Hodgson
v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303, 304 (1809).
5 6. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 11 cmt. a (1982). "It is a fundamental
precept that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. The limits upon federal
jurisdiction, whether imposed by the Constitution or by Congress, must be neither
disregarded nor evaded." Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374
(1978).
57. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States.").
58. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
59. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 77v(a) (1994 & Supp. 1996) (discussing the "U]urisdiction of
offenses and suits"). Congress granted concurrent jurisdiction to controversies arising
under the Securities Act as follows:
The district courts of the United States and United States courts of any
Territory, shall have jurisdiction of offenses and violations . . . concurrent
with State and Territorial courts, of all suits in equity and actions at law
brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this subchapter. Any such
suit or action may be brought in the district wherein the defendant is found or
is an inhabitant or transacts business, or in the district where the offer or sale
took place, if the defendant participated therein . . . . No case arising under
this subchapter and brought in any State court of competent jurisdiction shall
be removed to any court of the United States.
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Exchange Act.6°
C. Limits on the ExtraterritorialReach of FederalJurisdiction
Two basic legal principles limit the extraterritorial application of
United States laws: the presumption against extraterritoriality 6' and the
doctrine of international comity. 62 However, neither principle acts as
an absolute bar, particularly if domestic interests are at stake.6 3
1. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
Congress has the constitutional authority to extend the reach of
domestic laws beyond the United States' borders.64 If, however,
Congress is silent with regard to whether jurisdiction extends beyond
the borders of the United States, there is a presumption against
extraterritoriality. 65 The basic justification for this canon of statutory
60. See id. § 78aa; see also infra Part II.D (discussing the subject matter jurisdiction
provisions in the Exchange Act). Congress granted exclusive jurisdiction to the federal
judiciary for claims arising under the Exchange Act as follows:
The district courts of the United States . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of
violations of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all
suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty
created by this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder ....
Any suit or
action to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or rules and
regulations thereunder ... may be brought in any such district or in the district
wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business, and
process in such cases may be served in any other district of which the
defendant is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be found.
15 U.S.C. § 78aa.
61. See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing the presumption against extraterritoriality with
regard to domestic legislation).
62. See infra Part II.C.2 (explaining that principles of international comity may
restrict the jurisdictional reach of United States courts).
63. See infra Part II.C.3 (discussing situations in which United States courts
recognize their authority to exercise their jurisdiction extraterritorially, despite the
ordinary presumption against extraterritoriality and the principles of international
comity).
64. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) ("Congress has the
authority to enforce its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States.").
For an excellent critique of the presumption against extraterritoriality, see Jonathan
Turley, "When in Rome": Multinational Misconduct and the Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality,84 Nw. U. L. REv. 598 (1990) (arguing that the presumption against
extraterritoriality is an archaic relic of legal realism that discourages multinational
corporations from promoting corporate responsibility).
65. See Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) (holding that a federal
labor law did not apply extraterritorially); see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California,
509 U.S. 764, 794-99 (1993) (holding that the Sherman Antitrust Act, which governs
restraints on interstate and foreign commerce, applies to foreign conduct); Wade Estey,
Note, The Five Bases of ExtraterritorialJurisdictionand the Failureof the Presumption
Against Extraterritoriality,21 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 177, 181-207 (1997)
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construction is that Congress is interested in the status of domestic
The presumption against
rather than foreign concerns.66
extraterritoriality can be overcome if the language and structure of a
statute or its legislative history indicate a congressional intent that the
statute ought to apply to areas outside of the United States.67

2. Principles of International Comity
International comity is the practice of courtesy and good will that
one nation shows for the national interests of another nation.68 If the
presumption against extraterritoriality does not preclude a United
States court from having jurisdiction, principles of international comity
may restrict the extraterritorial application of American laws.6 9
Principles of international comity discourage the application of one
nation's laws if they conflict with the laws of another nation and have
an adverse effect on the other nation's ability to enforce its own
laws.7" In other words, the exercise of international comity helps
protect against conflicts between domestic law and the law of foreign
(proposing a reformulation of the presumption against extraterritoriality). But see
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 246-47 (holding that Title VII, which protects against
employment discrimination, does not apply extraterritorially).
66. See Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285. The Foley Bros. court stated the following:
The canon of [statutory] construction which teaches that legislation of
Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the
• . . United States is a valid approach whereby unexpressed congressional
intent may be ascertained. It is based on the assumption that Congress is
primarily concerned with domestic conditions.
Id. (citations omitted).
67. See id. But seeArabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 261 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(stating that the presumption against extraterritoriality is "not a clear-statement rule"
and can be applied "only after exhausting all of the traditional tools" of statutory
analysis, such as legislative history, statutory structure, and administrative
interpretations).
68. See Merritt B. Fox, The Political Economy of Statutory Reach: U.S. Disclosure
Rules in a Globalizing Market for Securities, 97 MICH. L. REv. 696, 729 n.81 (1998).
Comity is not a formal obligation one nation owes to another; rather, it is a display of
goodwill on the part of one nation toward another. See id.
69. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 814-15 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
70.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 101 cmt. e (1987). There

are various definitions of comity. See id. International comity can be described as "the
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or
judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the
protection of its laws." Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895); see also BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 267 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "comity"). International comity does not
strip courts of subject matter jurisdiction; rather, international comity serves as a
justification to refuse to exercise jurisdiction. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 13, §
5.07[1].
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nations.7 Thus, the Supreme Court expresses hesitation regarding the
imposition of United States laws upon foreign parties in foreign
jurisdictions.
3. Overcoming Territorial Limitations on Jurisdiction
Generally, if Congress intends to extend the jurisdiction of United
States courts beyond domestic borders, the language of the statute
must provide some indicia of that intent.73 Indicia of congressional74
intent include statutory provisions addressing conflict of laws issues
and express grants of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 75 The Supreme
Court, however, has held that jurisdiction applies extraterritorially in
certain situations, even without express statutory language or other
indications of congressional intent, despite the presumption against
extraterritoriality and principles of international comity.7 6 The
7 1. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 816-17 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citing McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras,
372 U.S. 10, 20-22 (1963)) (discussing conflict of laws principles and international
comity); see also EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 13, § 5.07[1] (stating that choice of law
theories include elements of comity). Although comity is essentially a conflict of laws
issue, "conflict of laws is that part of the law of each state which determines what effect
is given to the fact that the case may have a significant relationship to more than one
state." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2 cmt. b & c (1988).
Accordingly, the Restatement definition of conflict of laws applies solely to conflicts
among the States of the United States, and not to conflicts between the United States and
other nation states. See id. § 10. International cases and controversies may involve
different circumstances requiring a resolution that differs from the appropriate resolution
in an entirely domestic case. See id. However, "an act of Congress ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains .
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
72. See Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 255 (holding that Title VII does not apply
extraterritorially to foreign employers of American employees working abroad). In
Arabian American Oil Co., only Justice Marshall, in a separate dissenting opinion,
explicitly discussed principles of international comity. See id. at 261-63 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). The majority, however, did implicitly address international comity
concerns when Chief Justice Rehnquist stated: "Without clearer evidence of congressional intent to do so . . . . we are unwilling to ascribe to that body a policy which
would raise difficult issues of international law by imposing this country's employmentdiscrimination regime upon foreign corporations operating in foreign commerce." Id. at
255.
73. See id. at 250-51.
74. See id. at 256 (concluding that the statute's jurisdiction did not extend beyond the
United States because the statute spoke "in terms of 'states"' and did not "mention
foreign nations").
75. See id. at 258.
76. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 769-70 (holding that the Sherman
Antitrust Act applies to foreign conduct that causes adverse domestic effects); Steele v.
Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285 (1952) (holding that the Lanham Trademark Act
applies extraterritorially). In a separate opinion to Hartford Fire Insurance Co., Justice
Scalia questioned whether federal statutes should be extended extraterritorially on the
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Supreme Court ruled that the Lanham Act, which regulates improper
trademark usage, applies extraterritorially because: (1) violations of
the Lanham Act have an effect within the United States; (2) the
Lanham Act provides a "broad jurisdictional grant"; and (3) Congress
has the authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations.77
Similarly, the Supreme Court held that federal antitrust laws extend
beyond domestic borders if the parties intended anticompetitive
conduct in another country to have a substantial effect in the United
States and the conduct actually did have a substantial domestic effect.7"
International comity becomes an issue in such a situation only if "there
is in fact a true conflict between domestic and foreign law." 79 No

conflict of law problem exists, however, if someone is subject to the
laws of two countries and must comply with the laws of both
countries.8 ° Thus, a conflict of law situation does not arise merely
because both countries have strong policy reasons for encouraging
certain conduct through their rules and regulations. 8'
basis of "boilerplate language," like that of the Sherman Antitrust Act. See Hartford Fire
Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 814 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Scalia agreed that certain federal laws sometimes reach extraterritorially, but only
because precedent compelled him to do so. See id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("[I]f the question were not governed by precedent, it would be worth
considering whether the presumption [against extraterritoriality] controls the outcome
here.").
77. See Steele, 344 U.S. at 284, 286-89.
7 8. See HartfordFire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 795-96.
79. Id. at 798 (quoting Soci&6 Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale v. United States
Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 555 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part)).
80. See id. at 799 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 403 cmt. e (1987)). For example, a person may harm someone in
another country by shooting a bullet across national boundaries. See Bersch v. Drexel
Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 987 (2d Cir. 1975); A.L.I. FED. SECURITIES CODE § 1905
cmt. (3)(b) (1980) (describing the "subjective territorial principle"). Both the country
in which the conduct (the shooting) occurs and the country in which the effect (the harm
to the victim) occurs have a legitimate interest in exercising jurisdiction over the
shooting. See Bersch, 519 F.2d at 987.
81. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 799 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 415 cmt. j (1987)). Justice Scalia
thought the majority's decision regarding international comity was misguided because it
failed to distinguish between the district court's jurisdiction over the case and the
substantive merits of the case. See id. at 812 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). According to Justice Scalia, "it is important to distinguish two
distinct questions raised by this petition: whether the District Court had jurisdiction,
and whether the Sherman Act reaches the extraterritorial conduct alleged here." Id.
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia suggested that the
question of a statute's extraterritorial reach must be subjected to a two-step analysis. See
id. at 814-15 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). First, a court must
use the presumption against extraterritoriality to analyze whether the statute transcends
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D. Jurisdictionunder the Exchange Act
Federal jurisdiction over securities claims is predicated upon specific
congressional grants of jurisdiction.82 Under the Exchange Act, the
federal judiciary has exclusive jurisdiction over "all suits in equity and
actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty" arising under
the Exchange Act.83 This jurisdictional grant, however, does not
expressly state whether jurisdiction extends extraterritorially.8 4
Furthermore, since the legislative history is barren with regard to the
extraterritorial reach of subject matter jurisdiction under the Exchange
Act," courts have developed two different "approaches" 86 to determine
whether they have jurisdiction over transnational 87
securities
transactions: the effects approach and the conduct approach.
domestic borders. See id. at 814 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). If
the court can rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality, it must then apply
principles of international comity and, if possible, avoid construing an act of Congress
in a manner that would violate the laws of nations. See id. at 814-15 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). If "interacting interests" of the United States
and of another country are both implicated, the court should attempt to limit the reach of
the statute to conduct occurring within domestic borders. See id. at 815-16 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). The majority disagreed with Justice Scalia,
noting that Scalia's analysis of comity does not comport with common interpretations
of the Sherman Antitrust Act. See id. at 797 n.24.
82. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v, 78aa (1994); see also supra notes 59-60 (quoting
respectively the jurisdictional provisions of the Securities Act and Exchange Act).
83. Id. § 78aa. The Securities Act, on the other hand, expressly confers concurrent
jurisdiction upon the federal judiciary and the state judiciaries. See id. § 77v.
84. See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206-09 (2d Cir. 1968); see also
Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 664 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.
Ct. 890 (1999) (indicating that "the statutory language [of the Exchange Act] gives us
little guidance").
85. See SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 n.21 (3d Cir. 1977). Focusing more on
personal jurisdiction than subject matter jurisdiction, one scholar argues that legislative
history is more replete with discussions of the extraterritorial reach of the securities
laws than courts acknowledge since Congress was in fact aware of the growing
internationalization of investment markets at the time it enacted the securities laws. See
The InternationalReach of Rule lOb-5, supra note 14, at 677, 694, 704-05.
86. See Kauthar, 149 F.3d at 665. The Seventh Circuit recently suggested that the
term "test" is problematic because it indicates that there are accepted canons of statutory
interpretation that courts consistently apply to transnational securities fraud cases. See
id. The Seventh Circuit rejected the use of the term "test" and adopted the term
"approach" to describe the current status of the law because "'test' is too inflexible a
term." Id. Twenty years before the Seventh Circuit's observation, one commentator
suggested that the term "test" oversimplifies the methods of determining subject matter
jurisdiction in transnational securities fraud cases. See Suzanne A. Schiro, Comment,
Jurisdictionin TransnationalSecurities Fraud Cases: SEC v. Kasser, 7 DENV. J. INT'L L.
& POL'Y, 279, 286 n.46 (1978); see also Continental Grain (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific
Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 416, n.ll (8th Cir. 1979).
87. See Kauthar, 149 F.3d at 665. The Seventh Circuit observed, "[a]lthough the
circuits that have confronted the matter seem to agree that there are some transnational
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1. Effects Approach
The effects approach supports the United States courts' jurisdiction
if actions in another country have a direct effect on American investors
89 was the first major
or markets.88 Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook
securities fraud case to extend subject matter jurisdiction beyond the
national boundaries of the United States. 90 In Schoenbaum, an

situations to which the antifraud provisions of the securities laws are applicable,
agreement appears to end at that point." Id. The United States Supreme Court has denied
certiorari to numerous cases involving the issue of subject matter jurisdiction over
transnational securities transactions. See id. at 659; Europe and Overseas Commodity
Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribas London, 147 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119
S. Ct. 1029 (1999); Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 116 S.Ct. 702 (1996); Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S.Ct. 639 (1991); United States v. Cook, 573 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 99 S.Ct. 119; SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 97
S. Ct. 2649; Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
96 S. Ct. 453; Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 200, cert. denied, 89 S. Ct. 1747. Some
Supreme Court Justices appear to have tacitly accepted the extension of jurisdiction
beyond domestic borders when federal securities laws are at issue. See, e.g., Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 529-31 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (Brennan,
J.; White, J.; Marshall, J., concurring with the dissent) (noting that foreign defendants
can be held liable for securities fraud if "they have profited by virtue of proscribed
conduct within our boundaries"). The Scherk majority expressly refrained from deciding
the issue of jurisdiction over a transnational securities transaction because the lower
court did not consider the issue and the petitioner failed to raise the issue on appeal. See
id. at 516 n.9. In contrast, the dissenting opinion stated, "[wihen a foreign corporation
undertakes fraudulent action which subjects it to the jurisdiction of our federal securities
laws, nothing justifies the conclusion that only a diluted version of those laws protects
American investors." Id. at 530-31 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
88. See Kauthar, 149 F.3d at 665.
89. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2nd Cir. 1968).
90. See id. at 204. It is significant that this first decision, as well as many
subsequent decisions, emanated from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals because the
Supreme Court of the United States has characterized the Second Circuit as the "Mother
Court" of securities law. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,
762 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Continental Grain (Austl.) Pry. Ltd., 592 F.2d at
413 (citing Justice Blackmun's dissent in Blue Chip Stamps); James J. Finnerty, III, The
"Mother Court" and the Foreign Plaintiff: Does Rule 10b-5 Reach Far Enough?, 61
FORDHAM L. REv. S287, S294 (1993); Roberta S. Karmel, The Second Circuit's Role in
Expanding the SEC's JurisdictionAbroad, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 743, 743 (1991). Prior
to Schoenbaum, a United States District Court dismissed a lawsuit by an American
plaintiff against Canadian defendants for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the
Exchange Act because "all the essentials of [these] transactions occurred without the
United States." Kook v. Crang, 182 F. Supp. 388, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). Although the
court admitted there were sufficient contacts with the United States to allow the court to
exercise jurisdiction over the foreign defendants, the court held that Congress legislates
in order to control domestic conditions, not foreign ones. See id. at 390-91 (citing
Foley Bros. Inc., v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949)). In other words, while there was
personal jurisdiction over the defendants, there was no subject matter jurisdiction over
the alleged wrongdoing. See id. at 390.
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American shareholder of a Canadian corporation 9 ' initiated a
shareholder derivative suit92 under Section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act.93 The plaintiff alleged that the defendants, who were Canadian
and American, attempted to defraud the corporation by failing to
disclose material information in order to buy securities at prices
artificially below the market price. 94 All of the actions pertaining to the
alleged fraud occurred in Canada rather than the United States.95
Furthermore, the buyers and sellers involved in the transaction were all
foreigners.96 The district court dismissed the plaintiffs action on the
ground that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, 97 holding that
such jurisdiction does not extend extraterritorially under the Exchange
Act. 98

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's
holding on subject matter jurisdiction. 99 The court held that the
plaintiff rebutted the presumption against extraterritorial applicability
by showing that the defendants' conduct in Canada had a direct effect
on American interests.'00 The court predicated its reasoning on the
"belief' that Congress intended the Exchange Act to extend
9 1. The corporation, Banff Oil Ltd., conducted all of its operations in Canada. See
Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 204. The corporation's common stock was "registered with
the SEC and traded upon both the American Stock Exchange and the Toronto Stock
Exchange." Id.
92. A shareholder derivative suit is an action brought on behalf of a corporation by
one or more shareholders of the corporation to enforce a right belonging to the
corporation. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
93. Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 204. For a discussion of the elements of a cause of
action under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, see supra notes 35-44 and
accompanying text.
94. See Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 204-05. In essence, the plaintiff accused the
defendants of engaging in "insider trading" because the defendants breached their
fiduciary duty to the corporation and its shareholders by deceiving the corporation
through withholding material information. See id. at 205; see also supra note 42
(defining insider trading).
95. See Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 204-06.
96. See id.
97. See id. at 204 (discussing the Schoenbaum district court opinion). The defendants
moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and for dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to rule 12(b). See id.
The district court never reached the issue of summary judgment because it held that it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction. See id.
98. See id.
99. See id. Ultimately, however, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling
with regard to summary judgment because the plaintiff failed "to state a cause of action
under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act." Id.; see also supra notes 29-44 and accompanying
text (discussing the elements of a cause of action under Section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act and Rule lOb-5).
100. See Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 206.
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extraterritorially when necessary to protect American investors. 1 The
court noted that Congress enacted the Exchange Act to protect
domestic investors and domestic securities markets. 10 2 If the
plaintiff's allegations were true, then there would be a "detrimental
effect" to United States investors and United States securities
markets. 113 Consequently, United States courts have an interest in
applying the fraud provisions of the Exchange Act to the defendants'
conduct because that conduct could have had negative domestic
effects. 104

Therefore, according to the Second Circuit, the effects approach
permits the exercise of federal jurisdiction when there is a sufficiently
adverse effect on United States investors or on the United States
securities market.105 A transaction has a sufficiently adverse domestic
effect if "foreseeable and substantial harm to interests in the United
States" results. 10 6 Courts must determine whether or not conduct
1 01. See id. The court remarked,
We disagree with the district court's conclusion. We believe that Congress
intended the Exchange Act to have extraterritorial application in order to
protect domestic investors who have purchased foreign securities on American
exchanges and to protect the domestic securities market from the effects of
improper foreign transactions in American securities.
Id.
102. See id.
103. See id. (citing Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911)). The court stated
that the "impairment of the value of American investments ...has . . . a sufficiently
serious effect upon United States commerce to warrant assertion of jurisdiction for the
protection of American investors." Id. at 208-09.
104. See id. at 206-09. Justice Holmes earlier declared, "[a]cts done outside a
jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a
State in punishing the cause of the harm as if [the actor] had been present at the effect, if
the State should succeed in getting [the actor] within its power." Strassheim, 221 U.S.
at 285.
105. See Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 206-09. Thus, the Schoenbaum court
"announced" the effects approach. See Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 122
(2d Cir. 1995). The American Law Institute formulates the effects test as follows: "(1)
The United States may generally exercise jurisdiction to prescribe with respect to ...(c)
conduct, regardless of where it occurs, significantly related to a [securities] transaction.
if the conduct has, or is intended to have, a substantial effect in the United States;..
The
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 416 (1987).
Restatement (Third) delineates three categories of jurisdiction under international law:
"jurisdiction to prescribe," "jurisdiction to adjudicate," and "jurisdiction to enforce." Id.
§ 401. Jurisdiction to prescribe, the type at issue for transnational securities fraud
cases, limits a state's ability "to make its laws applicable to the activities, relations or
status of persons, or in the interests of persons in things, whether by legislation, by
executive act or order, by administrative rule or regulation, or by determination of a
court." Id. § 401(a).
106. Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Leb.) S.A.L., 730 F.2d 1103, 1108 (7th Cir. 1984).
Some courts and commentators characterize the effects approach as the "objective
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outside the United States has a significant effect in the United States on
a case-by-case basis. °7 For example, if American stakes in a foreign
investment trust amount to only .5% of the total investment, there is
not a significant effect0 8 on the Americans if someone in Europe
defrauds the trust fund.
2. Conduct Approach
The conduct approach predicates jurisdiction on conduct in the
United States, even if the conduct has no effect on domestic
interests. 10 9 Leasco Data ProcessingEquipment Corp. v. Maxwell l°
was the first case to propose the "conduct" approach, which allows a
United States court to have subject matter jurisdiction when domestic
conduct contributes to the commission of fraud that affects investors
and securities markets outside of the United States."' In Leasco,
British plaintiffs sued British defendants in a United States district
court." 2 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants committed securities
fraud by making false representations regarding the profitability of a
company that sold its shares on the London Stock Exchange."13
Although United States investors or United States investment markets
suffered no deleterious effects,"1 4 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
territorial principle" because it "grants jurisdiction over acts which cause foreseeable
and substantial effects within the territory regardless of where those acts occurred."
Continental Grain (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 416 (8th
Cir. 1979) (quoting Note, The ExtraterritorialApplication of the Antifraud Provisions of
the Securities Act, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 137, 139 (1978)); see also A.L.I. FED.
SECURITIES CODE § 1905 cmt. 4 (1980) (referring to the effects approach as the
"objective territorial approach").
107. See lIT v. Vencap. Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1016 (2d Cir. 1975).
108. See id. at 1016-17. The court also noted that "the fraud was practiced not on
individual Americans who purchased securities but on the trust in which they had
invested." Id. at 1016.
109. See Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 665 (7th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 890 (1999).
110. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir.
1972).
111. See id. at 1334. Chief Judge Friendly clearly differentiated the problem
presented in Leasco from the problem presented in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,405 F.2d
200 (2d Cir. 1968), on the grounds that Schoenbaum involved stock listed on a domestic
securities exchange and the transaction had an adverse effect on American investors. See
Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1333-34.
112. See Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1330.
113. See id. at 1330-33. The plaintiffs' cause of action for securities fraud arose
under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5. See id. at 1330; see also supra
notes 35, 39 (providing the text of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5).
114. Indeed, any harmful effects resulting from the defendants' conduct in the United
States would be felt in Europe, where the plaintiffs actually purchased the stock touted by
the defendants. See Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1334-35. If any of the defendants' overseas
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held that the federal district court had jurisdiction under the Exchange
Act to hear the case because the defendants made "abundant" or
"substantial" misrepresentations in the United States directed at foreign
buyers.' 15 In other words, the defendants' conduct in the United
16
States justified the exercise of jurisdiction by a United States court."
Under the conduct approach proposed by the Leasco court, the
presumption against extraterritoriality does not apply when the conduct
involved occurs within the United States, not outside.117 A court
cannot assume, however, that Congress always intends laws to be
applicable to the fullest extent allowed by the Constitution.' 18 With
regard to the application of federal securities laws to transnational
transactions, the defendant's conduct in the United States must be an
"extensive act" that forms "an essential link" in the chain of
causation." 9 The conduct, however, need not occur entirely in the
United States, considering that the language of the general antifraud
provision of the Exchange Act is broad in scope. 2 °
Finally, the Leasco court noted that there may be conflict of laws
issues when a court presides over a transnational securities fraud
claim. 2 ' It is likely, however, that Congress would want to protect
American investors from foreigners committing securities fraud in the
United States, even if the misconduct occurs only partially in the
United States. 122 Furthermore, a nation has the power to direct its
own law, rather than foreign law, if misconduct occurs on native
soil. 123

III. DISCUSSION
While many courts recognize that the conduct approach confers
jurisdiction when conduct pertaining to a fraudulent securities
conduct had an adverse effect which was "detrimental to the interests of American
investors," the district court could have used the effects approach to justify the exercise
of jurisdiction. Id. at 1333-34 (favorably quoting Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 208).
115. See Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1334-35.
116. See id. at 1334.
117. See id.
118. See id.; see also supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text (discussing the
Constitutional limits to federal subject matter jurisdiction).
119. See Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1335; see also Continental Grain (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v.
Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 417-18 (8th Cir. 1979) (stating that Leasco
analyzes the problem "from the perspective of causation").
120. See Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1336.
121. See id. at 1337.
122. See id.
123. See id.
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transaction occurs in the United States, 124 the circuits disagree on the
precise degree of domestic conduct required to grant subject matter
jurisdiction to domestic federal courts. 125 The Seventh Circuit
demarcated three different approaches to the conduct analysis: a
restrictive approach,2

6

a broader approach, 127 and a balancing

128

The restrictive approach demands that plaintiffs prove
approach.
that the conduct in the United States satisfies the prima facie elements
of a securities fraud case. 129 The broader approach requires plaintiffs
to prove that some of the conduct germane to the securities fraud
occurred in the United States. 3 ' The balancing approach involves a
case-by-case determination, which analyzes jurisdiction by weighing
124. See Kauthar SDN BHD v. Steinberg, 149 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
119 S. Ct. 890 (1999); Europe and Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribas
London, 147 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1029 (1999); Robinson
v. TCI/US W. Communications, Inc., 117 F.3d 900 (5th Cir. 1997); Zoelsch v. Arthur
Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d
421 (9th Cir. 1983); Continental Grain (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592
F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1979); SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1977). The American
Law Institute formulates the conduct test as follows:
1) The United States may generally exercise jurisdiction to prescribe with
respect to
(b) any transaction in securities
(i) carried out, or intended to be carried out, on an organized securities
market in the United States, or
(ii) carried out, or intended to be carried out, predominantly in the United
States, although not on an organized securities market;
(d) conduct occurring predominantly in the United States that is related to a
transaction in securities, even if the transaction takes place outside the United
States; ....

§ 416
(1987).
125. See Robinson, 117 F.3d at 905. Once courts acknowledge that the federal
securities laws apply extraterritorially to some degree, concurrence "appears to end."
See Kauthar, 149 F.3d at 665. Indeed, "[t]he chronic difficulty ... has been describing,
in sufficiently precise terms, the sort of conduct occurring in the United States that
ought to be adequate to trigger American regulation of the transaction." Id.
126. See infra notes 133-49 and accompanying text (discussing the restrictive
approach); see also Kauthar, 149 F.3d at 665-66 (proposing the distinction of the three
different conduct approaches).
127. See infra notes 150-213 and accompanying text (discussing the broader
approach).
128. See infra notes 214-305 and accompanying text (discussing the balancing
approach).
129. See infra notes 133-49 and accompanying text (discussing the restrictive
approach).
130. See infra notes 150-213 and accompanying text (discussing the broader
approach).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
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the conduct in the United States against the conduct in other
countries.' 3' All three of these approaches address different policy and
legal dilemmas that arise from the purposes of the Exchange Act and
the principles of subject matter jurisdiction.132
A. Restrictive ConductApproach: Actual Violation
The narrowest of the conduct tests holds that the domestic conduct
alone must actually violate the securities laws. 133 In other words, the
conduct in the United States must fulfill all of the elements for a cause
of action under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 in order for a United
States court to exercise jurisdiction. 34 Conduct that is even vaguely35
preparatory in nature will not be sufficient to confer jurisdiction.
136
Rather, the conduct must directly cause the complainant's losses.

131. See infra notes 214-305 and accompanying text (discussing the balancing
approach).
132. See Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 665-66 (7th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 890 (1999). "Identification of those circumstances that warrant such
regulation [beyond United States borders] has produced a disparity in approach, to some
degree doctrinal and to some degree attitudinal, as the courts have striven to implement
[congressional intent]." Id. at 665.
133. See Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The
Court of Appeals for the Circuit of the District of Columbia appears to be the only circuit
that uses the restrictive analysis to construe the conduct approach. See Kauthar, 149
F.3d at 665 (placing the District of Columbia Circuit at the narrow "end of the spectrum"
of conduct approach cases). But see Robinson v. TCI/US W. Cable Communications
Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 905 n.10 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating that Zoelsch "cannot reasonably
be read to have fashioned a new rule" that is more restrictive than the Second Circuit's
approach). Circuit Judge Bork drafted the Zoelsch opinion for the District of Columbia
Circuit. See Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 28. In his concurrence, Chief Judge Wald distanced
himself from the reasoning the majority employed. See id. at 37 (Wald, C.J.,
concurring). Chief Judge Wald expressed both his disagreement with the "restrictive
test" and his agreement with the "less strict approach adopted by the Third, Eighth, and
Ninth Circuits .... " Id. at 36 (Wald, C.J., concurring); see also infra notes 150-213 and
accompanying text (discussing the less restrictive approach proposed by the Third,
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits).
134. See Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 31; see also supra notes 35-44 and accompanying text
(discussing the elements of a cause of action under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act
and Rule lOb-5). The Zoelsch court enumerated the basic elements of a Section 10(b)
cause of action that must occur in the United States. See Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 31.
Generally, a plaintiff alleging transnational securities fraud must prove that the activity
in the United States included: (1) fraudulent statements or misrepresentations; (2) made
by the defendant with scienter; (3) in connection with the sale or purchase of securities;
and (4) which caused harm to the plaintiff. See id. Under the restrictive approach, only
the plaintiffs damages and his actual reliance may occur outside the United States. See
id.
135. See Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 30-35.
13 6. See id.
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Proponents of the "restrictive approach"' 37 base their argument on
several premises. 3 ' First, principles of international comity may
suggest that jurisdiction should not be exercised if it would impinge
upon the jurisdiction of another nation.'39 Closely connected with the
issue of international comity is the presumption against extraterritoriality. 4 0 The restrictive approach ultimately rebuts the
presumption against extraterritoriality. 14 ' The policy underlying this
presumption, however, is crucial for understanding the restrictive
approach because this approach, like the presumption against extraterritoriality, assumes that the legislature is concerned entirely with
domestic interests, not foreign ones.'4 2
Furthermore, according to proponents of the restrictive approach,
federal courts cannot overstep the limits of jurisdiction conferred upon
the courts by Congress. 4 3 This assertion is based upon the premise
that Congress limits jurisdiction for sound reasons, such as judicial
economy.' 44 Unless Congress clearly intended for parties predominantly involved in foreign transactions to have access to United States
courts, courts should be leery of allowing the litigation, especially
when the conduct occurring in the United States does not significantly
contribute to securities fraud occurring beyond United States
borders.'45 Jurisdictional tests that are too fact specific provide strong
137. See Kauthar, 149 F.3d at 666 n.10.
138. See Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 31-33. The District of Columbia Circuit was very
dubious of any extension of United States jurisdiction beyond United States borders,
stating, "[wiere it not for the Second Circuit's preeminence in the field of securities law
and our desire to avoid a multiplicity of jurisdictional tests, we might be inclined to
doubt that an American court should ever assert jurisdiction over domestic conduct that
causes loss to foreign investors," Id. at 32.
139. See id. at 31; see also supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text (discussing
principles of international comity). Zoelsch begins its analysis by addressing the issue
of international comity even though the majority noted that such considerations
"appear[ed] to be minimal or nonexistent .... " Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 31.
140. See Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 31; see also supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text
(discussing the presumption against extraterritoriality).
141. See supra notes 64-67, 117 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning
behind the presumption against extraterritoriality and explaining why the conduct
approach does not fall within the ambit of that presumption).
142. See Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 31-32 (construing the territoriality of domestic
legislation).
143. See id. at 29-30; see also supra notes 45-60 and accompanying text (discussing
the limits of federal jurisdiction).
144. See Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 32.
145. See id. The Zoelsch court cites an oft-quoted passage by Judge Friendly of the
Second Circuit: "When ... a court is confronted with transactions that on any view are
predominantly foreign, it must seek to determine whether Congress would have wished
the precious resources of United States courts and law enforcement agencies to be
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incentives to increase litigation over the issue of jurisdiction itself."
Finally, advocates of the restrictive approach argue that it avoids
creating numerous cumbersome jurisdictional tests. 147 Needless legal
tests arise and multiply as courts violate the limits imposed 1by
48
Congress and as judges try to make decisions based upon policy.
In other words, the principle of separation of powers dictates against
adopting an overly liberal interpretation of the jurisdiction provisions
of the Exchange Act because policy decisions are
49 the proper domain of
the legislative branch, not the judicial branch.
B. Brbad Conduct Approach: Lesser Quantum of Domestic Conduct
The Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits adopted the broadest standard
of analysis for the conduct approach. 5 ° The broad conduct test
devoted to them rather than leave the problem to foreign countries." Zoelsch, 824 F.2d
at 32 (quoting Berch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cir. 1975)). Judge
Friendly has been applauded for his "comprehensive and scholarly opinions on [the]
subject" of securities jurisprudence. Continental Grain (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific
Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 413 (8th Cir. 1979); see also Margaret V. Sachs, Judge
Friendly and the Law of Securities Regulation: The Creation of a Judicial Reputation, 50
SMU L. REV. 777, 778-93 (1997) (describing the development of Judge Friendly's
reputation in securities regulation).
146. See Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 32 n.2 (criticizing the balancing test approach and any
test basing jurisdiction upon the specific facts of the case).
147. See id. In this regard, Judge Bork expressed doubt as to whether United States
courts should ever exercise jurisdiction over domestic acts that cause foreign losses. See
id. at 32.
148. See id. Thus, the majority in Zoelsch feared that it would engage in improper
"judicial activism" if it adopted a broader approach. See id. at 36 (Wald, C.J.,
concurring).
149. See id. at 32-33.
150. See Butte Mining PLC v. Smith, 76 F.3d 287, 291 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that
jurisdiction exists when "substantial steps in the perpetuation of the fraud were taken
here"); Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 36-37 (Wald, C.J., concurring) (refusing to adopt the
restrictive approach used by the majority); Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421,
424 (9th Cir. 1983) (adopting the test used by the Third and Eighth Circuits);
Continental Grain, 592 F.2d at 418-20 (concluding that jurisdiction exists when the
conduct in the United States is material); SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir.
1977) (holding that the federal securities laws "do grant jurisdiction in transnational
securities cases where at least some activity designed to further a fraudulent scheme
occurs within this country"); Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 595 (3d Cir.
1976) (recognizing the issue of fraudulent domestic conduct having an effect on foreign
nationals, but holding that the case at bar did not involve a predominantly foreign
transaction); Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 524 (8th Cir. 1973)
(holding that jurisdiction "attaches whenever there has been significant conduct with
respect to the alleged violations in the United States"); see also Kauthar SDN BHD v.
Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 666 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 890 (1999)
(placing the Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits at the broad "end of the spectrum" of
conduct approach cases); Robinson v. TCI/US W. Cable Communications Inc., 117
F.3d 900, 906 (5th Cir. 1997) ("The Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits . . . generally
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requires "some lesser quantum of conduct" than do the other methods
of analysis.' 5 ' Courts applying the broad standard hold that some
conduct in the United States is sufficient to confer jurisdiction over the
fraudulent transaction if the conduct is meant to perpetuate the
fraudulent scheme.152 Mere preparation, however, as opposed to
material conduct, is not enough to allow jurisdiction. 53 Proponents of
the broader conduct approach claim that a broader interpretation
comports with the remedial purposes of the Exchange Act'54 because
the Exchange Act must protect a wide range of litigants to effectively
promote higher ethical standards in business transactions.' 5
1. Eighth Circuit Conduct Analysis Jurisprudence: Reasoning on the
Basis of Policy
The Eighth Circuit was the first circuit to expressly adopt the
conduct analysis originally proposed by the Second Circuit in Leasco
Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell. 5 6 According to the
Eighth Circuit, a court has subject matter jurisdiction in a transnational
fraud case if there was "significant conduct" in the United States with
regard to the alleged wrongdoing. 57 If there has been significant
domestic conduct, the fact that the buyer purchased the foreign
securities abroad is irrelevant. 58 The question, however,
remains:
159
What constitutes significant conduct in the United States?
The Eighth Circuit suggested that courts must examine the
transaction as a whole to determine whether the conduct is significant

require some lesser quantum of conduct."); Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 31 (observing that the
Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have "relaxed" the conduct test in comparison to the
Second Circuit).
151. Robinson, 117 F.3d at 906.
152. See Kasser, 548 F.2d at 114.
153. See Grunenthal, 712 F.2d at 424-25.
154. See id. at 424; see also supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text (discussing
the remedial purposes of the Exchange Act).
155. See Grunenthal, 712 F.2d at 425.
156. See Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 523-24 (8th Cir. 1973); see
also Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
The Travis court noted that cases involving transnational securities fraud are not
restricted to instances in which there are adverse domestic effects. Travis, 473 F.2d at
523-24 n.14 (construing Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968)). The
court observed that Schoenbaum was not a "limiting decision" which "set forth the
exclusive circumstances in which extraterritorial application of the [Exchange] Act is
proper." See id. (favorably citing Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 468 F.2d 1326.
157. See Travis, 473 F.2d at 524.
158. See id.
159. See id.

702

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 30

enough to allow a federal court to exercise jurisdiction. 160 A bigpicture examination is necessary because the essential elements of a
scheme to defraud may slowly unfold over time and across national
" ' Furthermore, whether the securities at issue are registered
borders. 16
or traded on an organized domestic market is irrelevant because the
Exchange Act's general antifraud provision62 expressly applies to
transactions involving unregistered securities.
In ContinentalGrain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds Inc.,

the Eighth Circuit further examined the issue of United States subject
matter jurisdiction over a transnational securities fraud case. 163 In
ContinentalGrain, the Australian plaintiff 164 alleged that Australian and
American defendants violated Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 by
concocting a "scheme of nondisclosure" regarding the status of a 10year license agreement supposedly belonging to an Australian
corporation in which the plaintiff invested. 165 Aware of the impending
termination of the licensing agreement, the defendants made several
transpacific telephone calls and corresponded by letter in order to
ensure that the loss of the licensing agreement would not be disclosed
to the plaintiff and thereby "spoil the deal."' 166 Ultimately, the
defendants executed the contract for the sale of the Australian target
company in
California, after which the parties finalized the deal in
167
Australia.

160. See id. at 526. The District of Columbia Circuit expressly rejected this
argument. See Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(using the restrictive approach to analyze the defendants' conduct). In Zoelsch, the
plaintiff argued that the court should "consider all the activity that surrounds any given
securities transaction as a single mass." Id. The court, utilizing the restrictive
approach, brushed aside this argument:
"[i]t is obvious that this suggestion is
completely antithetical to the approach we have adopted here. It bears no relation to the
tests for determining jurisdiction that have been adopted by any of the federal appellate
courts ....There seems nothing to recommend it." Id.
161. See Travis, 473 F.2d at 526; see also supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text
(discussing the elements of securities fraud).
162. See Travis, 473 F.2d at 526; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994) (prohibiting
the use of any manipulative or deceptive device with regard to the sale or purchase of any
registered or unregistered security). For an account of the basic elements of securities
fraud, see supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
163. See Continental Grain (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409
(8th Cir. 1979).
164. The plaintiff was a wholly-owned Australian subsidiary of a Delaware
corporation. See id. at 411.
165. See id. at 411-13. The licensing agreement at issue was significant because it
was the primary asset of the company in which the plaintiff invested. See id. at 411.
166. See id. at 411-12.
167. See id. at 412-13. After the execution of the sales contract in California, the
contract was hand delivered to the plaintiff in Australia. See id. The closing of the deal
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The district court dismissed the plaintiff's lawsuit due to lack of
subject matter jurisdiction and lack of personal jurisdiction.'68 The
Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling, using the broad
conduct approach as the basis for its holding. 169 Although the Eighth
Circuit had already ruled on the issue, 170 the Continental Grain court
of the Third Circuit's
decided to reexamine the issue in light
7'
approach.'
conduct
the
on
jurisprudence
In Continental Grain, the court clearly acknowledged that its
decision to adopt a broader conduct approach was based on policies of
international law, the Exchange Act's language, and the Exchange
Act's remedial goals.' 72 First, the court noted that a broader analysis
of conduct does not violate principles of international law because
under the "subjective territorial principle," a country can base jurisdiction on conduct occurring within its borders. 173 Furthermore, the
Exchange Act can apply to foreigners because nationality is not a basis
for conferring subject matter jurisdiction under the Exchange Act. 114
was held in Australia in order to avoid United States taxes. See id. At the closing, the
plaintiff made its initial payment in Australian dollars, after which the defendant's
corporate secretary converted the payment to United States funds and then wired the
payment to the United States. See id. Finally, the plaintiff paid the balance of the
purchase price in Australia, after which these funds were also wired to the United States.
See id. at 413.
168. See id. at 413.
169. See id. at 421-22.
170. See Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 523-24 (8th Cir. 1973).
171. See Continental Grain, 592 F.2d at 418-19; see also infra notes 183-98 and
accompanying text (discussing the Third Circuit's jurisprudence on the conduct
approach). The court averred, "[wie believe ...

that the Third Circuit

. .

.extended the

boundaries of the necessary domestic conduct required to find subject matter jurisdiction.
Continental
....
Grain, 592 F.2d at 418 (citing SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir.
1977)). Despite the decision to reexamine the issue of jurisdiction in transnational
securities cases, the court observed that the Third Circuit's broad approach was
consistent with a prior Eighth Circuit ruling. See id. at 419. Compare Kasser, 548 F.2d
at 114 (holding that jurisdiction exists "where at least some activity designed to further
a fraudulent scheme occurs within this country"), with Travis, 473 F.2d at 524 (holding
that jurisdiction attaches "whenever there has been significant conduct with respect to
the alleged violations in the United States").
172. See Continental Grain, 592 F.2d at 415-16.
173. See id. at 416. An example of the "subjective territorial principle" is that of a
person who shoots a bullet across national boundaries and harms someone in the other
country. See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 987 (2d Cir. 1975); A.L.I.
FED. SECURITIES CODE § 1905 cmt. (3)(b) (1980) (describing the "subjective territorial
principle"). Both the country in which the conduct (the shooting) occurs and the
country in which the effect (the harm to the victim) occurs have a legitimate interest in
exercising jurisdiction over the shooting. See Bersch, 519 F.2d at 987. If one country
asserts jurisdiction on the grounds that the gun was made in that country, however, the
connections of the shooting to that country become more tenuous. See id.
174. See Continental Grain, 592 F.2d at 417 ("Nor do we view the nationality of
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Second, the language of Section 10(b) is broad and is meant to
cover all sales and purchases of securities,175 regardless of whether the
transactions transpire on an organized United States market or not. 176
Section 10(b) does not exempt fraudulent acts in the United States
simply because their effects are "exported" to another country. 177
Congress did not intend to allow the United States
78 to be used as a safe
transactions.
transnational
fraudulent
haven for
Finally, the court observed that the Exchange Act expressly applies
to foreign commerce.17 9 Given the high standards of conduct
encouraged by the Exchange Act, "It]he range of significant conduct
should . . . be fairly inclusive."18 A broader interpretation of the
conduct analysis thus discourages people from using the United States
as a base of operations for fraudulent security schemes.181
Furthermore, a broader application of American securities laws
prevents the likelihood that foreign courts will refuse to provide
protections to Americans defrauded by foreign securities schemes.' 82
2. Third Circuit Conduct Analysis Jurisprudence: Loosening the
Standards
The Third Circuit was the next federal court to adopt the broad
conduct approach. 8 3 In SEC v. Kasser, 84 the SEC sought injunctive
defendants . . .as having any independent significance for jurisdictional purposes.")
(citing liT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1016 (2d Cir. 1975)).
175. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text (discussing the language of
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5).
176. See Continental Grain, 592 F.2d at 418 (citing Leasco Data Processing Equip.
Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1336 (2d Cir. 1972)); see also supra notes 35-44 and
accompanying text (discussing the elements of a cause of action under Section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act).
177. See Continental Grain, 592 F.2d at 420.
178. See id. at 420-21 ("We do not think Congress intended to allow the United
States to be used as a base for manufacturing fraudulent security devices for export, even
when these are peddled only to foreigners.") (citing Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1017).
179. See id. at 421.
180. Id.
181. See id. at 420
182. See id. at 421; infra notes 194-97 and accompanying text (discussing the
benefits of international reciprocity with regard to the enforcement of fraudulent
securities activity).
183. See SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1977).
184. Prior to Kasser, the Third Circuit recognized that subject matter jurisdiction may
be at issue in cases involving transnational securities transactions. See Straub v.
Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 595 (3d Cir. 1976). The Straub court held that there was
jurisdiction under the conduct approach because the transaction was predominantly
domestic. See id. The court did not provide an in depth analysis of subject matter
jurisdiction, however, since "the difficulties inherent in any attenuation of jurisdiction
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relief against defendants who had developed a fraudulent, "'ponzi'-like
scheme,"' 85 which laundered money through corporations and banks
located in Canada, Switzerland, and the United States. 186 Kasser,
therefore, involved a true transnational scheme because the disputed
transactions involved both conduct in the United States and in other
countries. 187 As a general proposition, the Kasser court asserted that if
at least some activity pertaining to the advancement of a transnational
fraud scheme occurs within the United States, then a United States
federal court has jurisdiction to hear the case.' 88
Under the broader conduct approach, the actual locus of the harm
does not have to be in the United States.' 89 Congress expressly
provided that the securities laws apply to "foreign commerce," thereby
providing that the securities laws encompass a "broad jurisdictional
scope.19' Indeed, the Exchange Act broadly defines "interstate
[were] not seriously implicated in the circumstances of [the] case[.]" Id.
185. See Kasser, 548 F.2d at 111. A ponzi scheme derives its name from renowned
speculator-swindler Charles Ponzi. See United States v. Cook, 573 F.2d 281, 282 n.3
(5th Cir. 1978). Ponzi was an Italian immigrant who employed a scheme involving
international postal reply coupons to bilk unsuspecting Americans out of millions of
dollars. See id. After serving a prison sentence for his activity, the United States
deported Ponzi to Italy where Mussolini hired him to work in the finance ministry. See
id.
A Ponzi scheme operates by promising high profits from fictitious sources. See
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1407 (3d ed. 1992). Money owed to earlier investors in
the scheme are paid off with funds contributed by later investors. See id. In Kasser, the
defendants promised to invest in a forestry development using funds obtained from the
Canadian-owned Manitoba Development Fund. See Kasser, 548 F.2d at 110-11.
Instead, the defendants "recirculated the proceeds" and converted them for their own
personal use by making equity investments that were supposed to be made using other
proceeds. See id. at 111. As a result of the defendants' activity, two of the defendant
corporations went bankrupt after $45,000,000 of the Manitoba Development Fund's
investments had already been fraudulently diverted to those corporations. See id.
186. See Kasser, 548 F.2d at 111. The district court dismissed the case on the
grounds that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the alleged fraud pertained to
"essentially foreign transactions without impact in this country." Id. at 112 (quoting
SEC v. Kasser, 391 F. Supp. 1167, 1176 (D.C.N.J. 1975)). The district court held that
"miscellaneous acts" in the United States were not substantial enough to transform the
transaction from a foreign one to a domestic one. See id. (quoting SEC v. Kasser, 391 F.
Supp. 1167, 1177 (D.C.N.J. 1975)).
187. See id. at 111-12. The court remarked, "[t]ransnational in character, the
fraudulent transactions arranged by the defendants spanned at least two continents. But
it is clear that a number of acts were committed within the United States." Id. at 111.
188. See id. at 114. The District of Columbia Circuit noted that the language in the
Kasser opinion "seems more permissive," thereby creating a "loosening of the
jurisdictional requirements." Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 31 (D.C.
Cir. 1987).
189. See Kasser, 548 F.2d at 114.
190. Id. In a footnote, the court observed that "the legislative history is silent
Id.
I..."
at 114 n.21.
respecting the jurisdictional scope .
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commerce" as including transactions transpiring "between any foreign
country and any State.' ' 91 According to the Third Circuit, it is
unlikely that Congress intended to "immunize" defendants simply
because pervasive fraudulent activity happens to affect foreign interests
instead of American interests.192 Consequently, instead of adopting a
"the sum total"
narrow ruling, courts should determine whether or not
193
substantial.
was
States
United
the
in
conduct
of the
Kasser also set forth three important policy rationales for broadly
reading the jurisdictional scope of the Exchange Act.' 94 First, denying
jurisdiction might encourage defrauders and manipulators of foreign
securities to use the United States as a "base of operations" since they
' Second, refusing jurisdiction
would have an effective "safe haven."195
raises the risk that other nations might refuse to enforce their securities
laws when conduct in those countries leads to detrimental effects in the
United States. 196 In other words, exercising jurisdiction increases the
possibility that foreign courts will take "reciprocal action" when United
States interests are at stake. 97 Finally, Congress devised the foreign
securities laws not only to prevent fraud and to protect investors, but
also to encourage high ethical standards of conduct in securities

191. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(17) (1994)). The Securities Act also defines
15
"interstate commerce" to include transactions taking place in "any foreign country.
U.S.C. § 77b(a)(7) (1994).
192. See Kasser, 548 F.2d at 114. The court stated that it "decline[d] to immunize,
for strictly jurisdictional reasons, defendants who unleash from this country a pervasive
scheme to defraud a foreign corporation. This would appear to be especially appropriate
where the corporation is owned by a foreign governmental subdivision of a neighboring
nation." Id.
193. See id. at 115 (holding that the dispositive factor was whether "the sum total of
the defendants' intra-national actions was substantial"). The court indicated that the sum
total of the conduct in the United States must be examined to determine whether that
conduct directly caused the losses outside domestic territory. See id.
194. See id. at 116. The court remarked, "it should be recognized that this case in a
Id.
I..."
(citing Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540
large measure calls for a policy decision .
F.2d 591, 595 (3d Cir. 1976)).
195. See id., 548 F.2d at 116. Employing a powerful analogy, the court remarked,
"[w]e are reluctant to conclude that Congress intended to allow the United States to
become a 'Barbary Coast,' as it were, harboring international securities 'pirates."' Id.
The Barbary Coast spans along the Mediterranean coast of northern Africa from the
Atlantic Ocean to Egypt. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 147 (3d ed. 1992). From
the 16th to the 19th century, pirates, financially backed by wealthy patrons, frequently
used the Barbary Coast as a base of operations to raid and loot ships sailing on the
Mediterranean. See id.
196. See Kasser, 548 F.2d at 116. The Kasser court stated, "our inclination towards
finding jurisdiction is bolstered by the prospect of reciprocal action against fraudulent
schemes aimed at the United States from foreign sources." Id.
197. Id.
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transactions. 1

3. Ninth Circuit Conduct Analysis Jurisprudence: Raising the
Standards of Business Ethics
The Ninth Circuit adopted the broad conduct approach in
Grunenthal v. Hotz.' 99 In Grunenthal, a West German plaintiff
alleged that Bahamian, Mexican, and Swiss defendants violated
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act by making misrepresentations with
regard to an agreement for the sale of a Mexican corporation. 20 0 The
litigants negotiated the deal in a series of meetings, most of which took
place outside the United States.2 0' The district court presiding over the
case dismissed it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.2 2 The Ninth
Circuit reversed the lower court's ruling2 3 by expressly adopting the
subject matter jurisdiction analysis proposed by the Third and Eighth
Circuits 204
198. See id.; see also supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text (discussing the
public policies underlying the federal securities laws, including the promotion of higher
ethical standards).
199. See Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1983).
200. See id. at 422-23.
201. See id. The first meeting occurred in Germany, the second in the Bahamas, and
the third in Mexico. See id. The parties met in Los Angeles, California to execute the
agreement and were supposed to close the transaction in the Bahamas, but the Bahamian
trustees declined to approve the final sale. See id. at 423. The gravamen of the
plaintiff's complaint was that the defendants misrepresented the identity of the target
company's beneficial owner during their meeting in the United States. See id. Further,
the plaintiff alleged that the defendants misrepresented their intention to actually
perform the terms of the agreement, which they executed in the United States. See id.
202. See id. The district court relied on Second Circuit precedent since there was no
controlling precedent in the Ninth Circuit at that time. See id. The lower court
determined that the lawsuit should be dismissed on the grounds that there was no
detrimental effect in the United States and that the defendants' conduct in the United
States was not significant enough to establish a jurisdictional nexus. See id.
(extensively citing Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 511 F. Supp. 582, 588 (C.D. Cal.
1981)). The district court noted that the conduct in each of the countries appeared "at
least equal to the conduct in the [United States]." Id. (citing Grunenthal GmbH, 511 F.
Supp. at 588). The lower court held that the misrepresentations made in Los Angeles
were merely repetitions of misrepresentations the defendants had previously made
extraterritorially. See id. (citing Grunenthal GmbH, 511 F. Supp. at 588). According to
the trial judge, execution of the agreement in the United States appeared to be for the
sake of "convenience" only. See id. (citing Grunenthal GmbH, 511 F. Supp. at 588).
203. See id. at 426. The Ninth Circuit remarked that "the jurisdictional hook need
not be large to fish for securities law violations .
Id. at 424 (quoting Lawrence v.
SEC, 398 F.2d 276, 278 (1st Cir. 1968)).
204. See id. The Grunenthal court noted that "the test used by the Third and Eighth
Circuits advances the policies underlying federal securities laws." Id. The court further
observed that while the Ninth Circuit "has spoken infrequently on the topic of subject
matter jurisdiction over transnational securities transactions[,]" it did adopt the "effects"
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The Ninth Circuit articulated two basic policies in support of its
conclusion.2"5 First, similar to the Third Circuit, denying jurisdiction
would serve as an incentive for people who want to use the United
States as a base of operations from which to commit fraud in other
countries." 6 Second, upholding jurisdiction over transnational transactions encourages a "high standard of business ethics in the securities
industry. 20 7 Business ethics are particularly important in transnational
transactions because the domestic actors are often professionals 28 who
in situations where the
should be encouraged to behave responsibly
2°
country.
this
in
felt
be
not
may
effects
While merely preparatory conduct is still insufficient to bestow
jurisdiction upon United States courts,210 the execution of an
agreement in the United States mitigates strongly in favor of granting
jurisdiction. 21' The appellate court rejected the district court's
reasoning that jurisdiction should be denied when a defrauder engages
in conduct in the United States merely for the sake of convenience.2 2
Convenience is an irrelevant factor when determining whether the
domestic conduct is sufficient for a United States court to exercise
jurisdiction because if convenience were a relevant consideration, it
would be easy for foreign citizens and corporations to use the United
States as a base of operations for securities fraud.21 3
C. Balancing Conduct Approach: HigherQuantum of Domestic
Conduct
The third approach to the conduct test attempts to balance the
competing interests involved in a transnational transaction by
mediating the conflict between the constitutional limits on the

approach in decisions prior to Grunenthal. Id. (citing Des Brisay v. Goldfield Corp.,
549 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1977); SEC v. United Fin. Group, 474 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1973)).
205. See id. at 424-25.
206. See id. (citing SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir. 1977)).
207. Id. at 425 (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau Inc., 375 U.S. 180,
186 (1963)).
208. See id. The experts acting in a transnational securities transaction include
lawyers, accountants, and underwriters. See id.
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. See id. The court noted that "the execution of the agreement in Los Angeles
itself constituted an act that strongly support[ed] [its] assertion of jurisdiction." Id.
212. See id.
2 13. See id. (stating that denial of jurisdiction would "make it convenient for foreign
citizens and corporations to use this country and its lawyers, accountants and
underwriters to further fraudulent securities schemes") (citations omitted).
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judiciary's jurisdiction and the protection of market integrity.214 In
order to establish jurisdiction under this balancing conduct approach,
"substantial acts" relating to the fraud must occur in the United
States. 215 This standard demands "a higher quantum of domestic
conduct" than the broader approach requires, but a lesser level of
conduct than the restrictive approach requires. 1 6 Mere preparatory
activity in the United States is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction.2 7
Furthermore, there is no United States jurisdiction if the majority of
the conduct takes place in another country.21 8 Rather, the domestic
conduct must directly cause the plaintiff's loss in order to confer
jurisdiction.2 19

Proponents of the balancing conduct approach contend that it finds
the proper balance between the competing interests of the narrow test
and the broad test.2 20 On the one hand, like the narrow test, it does not
impermissibly exceed the bounds of jurisdiction conferred upon the
federal courts by Congress.221 On the other hand, like the broad test,
it sufficiently prevents the use of domestic securities markets as safe
havens for fraudulent activity abroad.22 2
1. Second Circuit Conduct Analysis Jurisprudence: Setting the
Standards
In a pair of decisions, the Second Circuit elaborated on the conduct
approach it initially adopted in Leasco.223 Bersch v. Drexel Firestone,
214. See Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 666 (7th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 890 (1999). The Seventh Circuit noted, "[o]ur colleagues in the
Second and Fifth Circuits have set a course between the two extremes [of the restrictive
approach and the broader approach]. That approach requires a higher quantum of
domestic conduct than do the Third, Eighth and Ninth Circuits." Id.
215. See Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 722 F.2d 1041, 1045 (2d Cir. 1983)
(citing LIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975)).
216. Kauthar, 149 F.3d at 666.
217. See id. (citing Psimenos, 722 F.2d at 1046).
218. See Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1018 (stating that jurisdiction exists "where the bulk
of the activity was performed in foreign countries").
219. See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir. 1975); see also
note 44 (discussing plaintiff standing in Rule l0b-5 actions).
220. See Kauthar, 149 F.3d at 667 (noting that "[t]he Second and Fifth Circuits'
iterations of the test embody a satisfactory balance of these competing
considerations").
221. See id.
222. See id.
223. See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975); Vencap, 519
F.2d at 1001. The Second Circuit decided both Bersch and Vencap on April 28, 1975,
and Judge Friendly wrote the opinion for both cases. See Bersch, 519 F.2d at 977;
Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1003.
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Inc.224 involved a class action suit with a plaintiff class comprised
primarily of foreign citizens and foreign residents,225 who invested in a
Canadian corporation. 226 The corporation only offered the stock to a
select group of purchasers and did not offer the stock in the United
States.2 2 7 In a series of transactions, the defendants allegedly
defrauded the plaintiffs by making various "implied"
misrepresentations concerning the corporation's stability .228 The
complaint also included several particular charges of illegal activity and
mismanagement. 229 Although the defendants had attempted to
guarantee that their activities would not fall within the ambit of
American securities laws,23 ° the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants
engaged in sufficient conduct in the United States to allow a United
States court to entertain the case.2 3'

The Second Circuit held that the defendants had in fact engaged in
enough activity in the United States to authorize a United States court
to preside over the case.232 The Bersch court made three preliminary
observations. 233 First, the court warned that legislation is not always
meant to reach the greatest possible extent.234 This limited extension is
224. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975).
225. See id. at 977-78. While most of the plaintiffs were from Australia, Canada,
England, France, Germany, and Switzerland, there were some plaintiffs from various
countries in Asia, Africa, Europe, and South America. See id.
226. See id. at 978. The corporation was organized under Canadian law and had its
principal place of business in Switzerland. See id.
227. See id. at 980. Nevertheless, some Americans somehow obtained stock in the
company, but it was "murky" from the court record how that came about. See id. at 991.
According to the prospectus, the stock was "not being offered in the United States of
America or any of its territories or possessions or any area subject to its jurisdiction."
Id. at 980 (quoting the prospectus). Furthermore, the offering was "being made to
approximately 25,000 persons who are either (1) employees or sales associates of the
Company, (2) certain clients presently holding investments in managed funds or other
products of the Company, or (3) persons who have had a long-standing professional or
business relationship with the Company." Id. (quoting the prospectus).
228. See id. at 981.
229. See id. Specific charges included the failure to disclose that the corporation had
committed illegal activities; keeping the corporation's books and records in "chaotic
condition"; corporate officials over-touting the corporation's prospects for profits,
failure of the underwriters to use due diligence in the prospectus; and failure to follow
widely accepted accounting principles. See id. (listing the allegations of the plaintiffs'
complaint).
230. See id. at 982.
231. See id. at 984-85.
232. See id. at 985 ("We have no doubt that the activities within the United States
...were sufficient to authorize the United States to impose a rule ... .
233. See id. at 985-86.
234. See id. at 985 (quoting Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468
F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972)); see also supra notes 45-56 and accompanying text
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particularly important in the context of transnational securities
transactions because Congress did not intend to devote "the precious
resources of United States courts and law enforcement agencies" to
'
Second, a judgment
transactions that are "predominantly foreign."235
against an absent defendant may not be binding.236 Finally, the
antifraud provisions of the securities laws regulate many transactions
that occur on markets outside the United States or that involve
securities that do not have to be registered under the Exchange Act.2 37
Bersch established three basic principles with regard to the antifraud
provisions of the Exchange Act. 238 First, federal courts have
jurisdiction to preside over cases in which American residents
experience financial losses in the United States, regardless of whether
materially important conduct occurred in the United States.239 Second,
federal courts have jurisdiction to hear cases in which American
residents abroad suffer losses only if materially important conduct,
which significantly contributes to the loss, occurs in the United
States.24" Finally, United States courts do not have jurisdiction over
cases in which foreigners in other countries suffer losses, unless the
fraudulent conduct in the United States "directly caused" the losses.241
(discussing the limits to federal jurisdiction). The Leasco court provided the following
caveat: "it would be ... erroneous to assume that the legislature always means to go to
the full extent permitted." Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1334; see also supra notes 109-23 and
accompanying text (discussing the Leasco court's proposal of the conduct approach to
determine whether a United States court has subject matter jurisdiction over a
transnational transaction).
235. Bersch, 519 F.2d at 985.
236. See id. at 986. Thus, Bersch involved principles of international comity
because a judgment against the foreign defendants might conflict with the ruling of a
foreign court. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text (discussing principles of
international comity).
237. See Bersch, 519 F.2d at 986.
238. See id. at 993. The Bersch court observed:
We freely acknowledge that if we were asked to point to language in the
statutes, or even in the legislative history, that compelled these conclusions,
we would be unable to respond . . . . We recognize also that reasonable men
might conclude that the coverage was greater, or less, than has been outlined
in this opinion . . . . Our conclusions rest on case law and commentary
concerning the application of securities laws and other statutes to situations
with foreign elements and on our best judgment as to what Congress would
have wished if these problems had occurred to it.
Id.
239. See id.
240. See id.
241. See id. Adherents of the broader conduct approach suggest that constitutional
questions arise from the Second Circuit's application of different "tests" to non-U.S.
plaintiffs than to U.S. plaintiffs. See Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421, 426 n.9
(9th Cir. 1983); Continental Grain (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d
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In HT v. Vencap, Ltd.,24 2 the Second Circuit further examined "the

extent to which the federal securities laws apply to transnational
transactions.
Vencap is a unique decision because it begins with a
discussion of the merits of the case before discussing whether or not
the court had jurisdiction to preside over the case. 2" This maneuver
emphasizes the interrelation between procedural law and substantive
law. 245 This interrelation suggests that the Second Circuit was
applying a multifactoral approach to determine whether or not a given
transaction is transnational.246
The Second Circuit thus suggested that the facts of each case must
be weighed to determine whether the court has subject matter
jurisdiction over a transnational securities transaction.247 Conduct
generally directed at a transnational transaction is not enough to confer
jurisdiction. 24 8 Furthermore, if the plaintiffs to the lawsuit are not
409, 418 n.14 (8th Cir. 1979); Note, American Adjudication of Transnational Securities
Fraud, 89 HARV. L. REV. 553, 569 (1976); Comment, The TransnationalReach of Rule
lOb-5, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1376-77 (1973). The Second Circuit recently
acknowledged that due process issues arise under the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution when determining whether a United States court has jurisdiction over
a transnational securities fraud claim. See Europe and Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A.
v. Banque Paribas London, 147 F.3d 118, 127-28 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
1029 (1999).
242. IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
243. Id. at 1003-04.
244. See id. at 1011-14.
245. See id. at 1011. Judge Friendly stated:
Normally we would proceed at this point to the issue of subject matter
jurisdiction since, if that did not exist, it is immaterial whether or not the
plaintiffs have shown a sufficient probability of success on the merits to
warrant the grant of interlocutory relief. But here the two issues are
interrelated....
Id. (emphasis added). In a subsequent decision, Judge Friendly stated:
[W]hen the contested basis of federal jurisdiction is also an element of
plaintiff's asserted federal claim, the claim should not be dismissed for want of
jurisdiction except when it "appears to be immaterial and made solely for the
purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or where such a claim is wholly
insubstantial and frivolous."
AVC Nederland B.V. v. Atrium Inv. Partnership, 740 F.2d 148, 152-53 (2d Cir. 1984)
(quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1945)). Both of these passages by Judge
Friendly echo the words of Justice Holmes, "whenever we trace a leading doctrine of
substantive law far enough back, we are very likely to find some forgotten circumstance
of procedure at its source."

OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 199 (Mark

DeWolfe Howe, ed., Harvard University Press 1963) (1881).
246. See Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1016-18 (noting that conduct in the United States
satisfying one element of fraud is not necessarily dispositive for determining subject
matter jurisdiction).
247. See AVC Nederland, 740 F.2d at 154.
248. See id.
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United States citizens, the conduct in the United States must be
material to the actual completion of the fraudulent scheme. 4 9
Likewise, foreign "transients" passing through the United States, who
are protected by their own nations' laws, cannot seek redress in United
States courts. 250 The Second Circuit justified treating foreign plaintiffs
differently on the grounds that it is "unimaginable" that United States
securities laws should protect foreign investors conducting
transactions that for the most part take place abroad.25'
According to the standards proposed by the Second Circuit, subject
matter jurisdiction can also be predicated
upon some combination of
the conduct test and the effects test, 252 even if the2 conduct
by itself is
insufficient to support subject matter jurisdiction. 3 For instance, the

249. See Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475, 478 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing Psimenos v. E.F.
Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041, 1046 (2d Cir. 1983) (discussing the extraterritorial reach
of subject matter jurisdiction under the Commodity Exchange Act)). In Alfadda, the
defendants' conduct in the United States was material because it resulted in the
consummation of the fraud. See id. at 478-79. Thus, Alfadda follows the holding of
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., which required the activity in the United States to
directly cause the loss to injured foreign investors for a United States court to exercise
jurisdiction. See id.; see also supra notes 238-41 and accompanying text (discussing the
three principles articulated in Bersch).
250. See Europe and Overseas Commodity Traders v. Banque Paribas London, 147
F.3d 118, 128 n.12 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1029 (1999). In its holding,
the court stated that,
a series of [phone] calls to a transient foreign national in the United States is
not enough to establish jurisdiction under the conduct test without some
additional factor tipping the scales in favor of our jurisdiction. Without such
added weight, the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction [i.e., subject matter
jurisdiction] by Congress would be unreasonable . . . and is particularly so
when the transaction is clearly subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of another
country with a clear and strong interest in redressing any wrong. We do not
think Congress intended to make the securities laws have such a broad reach or
to make U.S. courts available for such suits.
Id. at 129 (citations omitted).
251. See Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1016. Judge Friendly stated, "it is simply
unimaginable that Congress would have wished the anti-fraud provisions of the
securities laws to apply if, for example, [a United States citizen residing in the Bahamas]
while in London had done all the [fraudulent] acts here charged and had defrauded only
European investors." Id.
252. Under the effects approach, a United States court has jurisdiction in a
transnational securities fraud case if the alleged fraud had a substantial effect on United
States investors or securities markets. See supra Part II.D.l (discussing the effects
approach).
253. See Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group. PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 124 (2d Cir. 1995). The Itoba
court remarked: "There is no requirement that [the conduct test and the effects test] be
applied separately and distinctly from each other. Indeed, an admixture or combination
of the two often gives a better picture of whether there is sufficient United States
involvement to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by an American court." Id. at 122.
For discussions of Itoba, see Joseph P. Garland & Brian P. Murray, Subject Matter
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mere failure to register a security in the United States is not significant
enough conduct to give a United States court jurisdiction over a
transnational securities transaction, even if the security is intended for
sale in the United States.254 If the failure to register a security,
however, is coupled with a deleterious effect to United States
investment markets, then subject matter jurisdiction may be proper
because the transaction defeats the basic purposes underlying full
disclosure .255

2. Fifth Circuit Conduct Analysis Jurisprudence: Limiting
Jurisdiction Absent an Express Legislative Command
When first confronted with the issue of subject matter jurisdiction
over a transnational securities transaction, the Fifth Circuit declined "to
formulate the outer perimeter of American jurisdiction. 256 In MCG,
Inc. v. Great Western Energy Corp.,2 "7 however, the Fifth Circuit
adopted the Second Circuit's balancing approach rather than the "more
relaxed standard" of the Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits.25 8
The MCG court noted at the outset that the existence of subject
matter jurisdiction "turns on the facts" in transnational securities fraud
cases. 25 9 MCG involved the sale of securities on the London Stock
Exchange.26' The securities were not registered in the United States
and were offered exclusively to investors who were not United States

Jurisdiction Under the Federal Securities Laws: The State of Affairs After Itoba, 20 MD. J.
INT'L L. & TRADE 235 (1996); Mark B. Schwartz, Comment, Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group
PLC: An Apple that Fellfrom the Wrong Branch, 22 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 467 (1996).
254. See Itoba, 54 F.3d at 124. The same standards do not apply to the registration
provisions and the antifraud provisions of the securities laws. See id.; see also supra
note 29 (discussing the regulation regime of the federal securities laws).
255. See Itoba, 54 F.3d at 124; see also supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text
(discussing the policies justifying the registration regime of the federal securities laws).
256. United States v. Cook, 573 F.2d 281, 283 (5th Cir. 1978). In Cook, the
defendant operated a ponzi scheme out of Dallas, Texas by offering phony oil and gas
wells in the United States as a means to defraud European investors. See id. at 282-83;
see also supra note 185 (explaining ponzi schemes). The Cook court held there was no
need to adopt a specific position regarding the conduct analysis of subject matter
jurisdiction because the extensiveness of the scheme's domestic operations gave the
court "little pause" that the case fell within the limits of United States jurisdiction. See
Cook, 573 F.2d at 283.
257. MCG, Inc. v. Great W. Energy Corp., 896 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1990).
258. See id. at 174-75. Subsequently, the Fifth Circuit noted that MCG "merely
noted the existence of the circuit split" and did not expressly adopt a position.
Robinson v. TCI/US W. Cable Communications Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 906 (5th Cir.
1997); see also infra notes 270-86 and accompanying text (discussing Robinson).
259. See MCG, 896 F.2d at 173.
260. See id. at 172.
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" ' Several American investors, however, somecitizens or nationals.26
how procured the stock.262 Subsequently, the American investors
brought suit alleging that the defendants violated American securities
laws by making fraudulent representations concerning the profitability
of the investment.263
The district court dismissed the case due to a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction because after the plaintiffs had "taken every measure to
avoid the [federal] securities laws, plaintiffs could not now seek their
protections.,, 264 The Fifth Circuit agreed that there was not enough
activity in the United States to sustain jurisdiction. 265 The appellate
court held that determination of subject matter jurisdiction must be
made on a case-by-case basis and that no single factor is per se
dispositive.266 The Fifth Circuit noted that since the plaintiffs went to
such lengths to acquire the securities, despite the express exclusion of
American investors, they could not cry foul when the investment failed
to produce the results they expected. 267 The court further observed
that the procedural issue of subject matter jurisdiction was not
necessarily interwoven with the substantive merits of the case.26 8
Hence, when the determination of subject matter jurisdiction involves a
"discrete set of facts" that is distinguishable from those involved in the
case's merits, a court can dismiss the case regardless of whether the

claim is meritorious or not.269

Several years later, in Robinson v. TCI/US West Cable
Communications Inc.,27 ° the Fifth Circuit had the opportunity to
261. See id.
262. See id. at 172-73. It is not clear from the facts how the American investors
managed to circumvent the purchaser restrictions. See id. at 172. It was clear, however,
that they tried to "structure transactions to their financial advantage." Id. at 175 n.5.
The plaintiffs knew that the transaction was not governed by United States securities
laws, and yet they purposefully sought to procure the securities. See id. at 175.
263. See id. at 172-73.
264. Id. at 173.
265. See id. at 176.
266. See id. at 175.
267. See id. The court noted, "[h]aving gone to such lengths to structure a
transaction not burdened by the securities laws, plaintiffs cannot expect to wrap themselves in their protective mantle when the deal sours." Id. at 175.
268. See id. at 176; see also supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text (discussing
the distinction between the merits of a case and subject matter jurisdiction).
269. See MCG, 896 F.2d at 176; see also supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
When the facts pertinent to subject matter jurisdiction cannot be discerned from the facts
pertinent to the merits, a claim cannot be dismissed due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction, unless the claim is legally insufficient. See MCG, 896 F.2d at 176 n.6 (citing
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946)).
270. Robinson v. TCI/US W. Cable Communications, Inc., 117 F.3d 900 (5th Cir.
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reexamine its stance on subject matter jurisdiction over transnational
securities claims.27' In Robinson, a British plaintiff alleged that the
defendant induced him to sell his shares in a British company for less
than they were worth.272 The complaint stated that the British
company, which American companies controlled, instructed a British
merchant bank to prepare an inaccurate statement of the true value of
the company. 273 The legal department of the controlling American
company prepared and faxed the instructions to prepare the inaccurate
statement in the United States. 274 The legal department faxed the
instructions to England on the American company's letterhead. 275 The
district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.276
Even though most of the conduct relating to the fraud occurred in
England, 77 the Fifth Circuit held that it had subject matter jurisdiction
by using the conduct approach proposed by the Second Circuit.278
Notwithstanding the federal courts' limited jurisdiction and the
presumption against extraterritoriality,279 the Robinson court held that
when conduct in the United States is "of material importance" to the
fraud or "directly caused" by the fraud, a United States court is
competent to preside over a case of transnational securities fraud.280
The Fifth Circuit agreed that most of the material conduct of a
transnational transaction may occur outside the United States; 28'
however, the court held that when the events occurring in the United
States are "key events," a United States court may properly exercise its
jurisdiction.282 The Fifth Circuit recognized the importance of the
1997).
271. See id. at 904-08.
272. See id. at 903.
273. See id. at 903-04.
274. See id. at 903.
275. See id.
276. See id.
277. See id. at 907.
278. See id.; see supra notes 109-23, 223-55 and accompanying text (discussing the
conduct approach developed by the Second Circuit). The Robinson court was aware of
the circuit split regarding the conduct approach. See Robinson, 117 F.3d at 905-06.
After examining the different approaches, the Fifth Circuit declared, "[w]e adopt the
Second Circuit's test as the better reasoned of the competing positions." Id. at 906.
279. See Robinson, 117 F.3d at 906.
280. See id. at 905-06 (citing Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir.
1995)). The Fifth Circuit suggested that the limited jurisdiction of the federal judiciary
as well as the presumption against extraterritoriality were decisive in choosing between
the alternative approaches to subject matter jurisdiction. See id. at 906.
281. See id. at 907.
282. See id.
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policy considerations relied upon by the proponents of the broader
approach.283 Given the limits of federal jurisdiction, however, the
Fifth Circuit refused to broaden its jurisdiction on the ground that an
over-extension of jurisdiction was "unwarranted in the absence of an
express legislative command., 28 4 Courts should not extend jurisdiction beyond the minimum amount necessary to implement the purposes
of American securities regulation.285 In this regard, the Fifth Circuit
concurred with the restrictive approach's apprehension about judicial
activism, which bases judicial rulings on policy rather than on
statutory language and limits of federal jurisdiction.286
3. Seventh Circuit Conduct Analysis Jurisprudence: Defining the
"Approaches" to Conduct Analysis
KautharSDN BHD v. Sternberg287 made the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals the most recent court to take a stance regarding the degree
of conduct required to confer a federal court with jurisdiction over a
transnational securities transaction.288 Kauthar involved a claim by a
Malaysian corporation against American defendants.2 8 9 The plaintiff
alleged that the defendants fraudulently induced it to invest thirty-eight
million dollars in a Caribbean company that provided satellite communications services .29 Eventually, the Caribbean corporation went
bankrupt, and the Malaysian plaintiff realized that the stock in the
corporation was worthless. 291 The plaintiff filed suit alleging that the
defendants violated United States securities laws because the
defendants carried out a "host of alleged general activities" in the
United States involving conduct sufficient to allow a United States
283. See id. at 906-07.
284. Id. at 906 (expressly rejecting the broader approach) (citing Zoelsch v. Arthur
Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). The Fifth Circuit noted that the
presumption of extraterritoriality informed its adoption of the Second Circuit approach.
See id.
285. See id.; see also supra notes 29-44 and accompanying text (discussing the
policies underlying the federal securities laws). The court observed that American
securities laws "are designed to protect American investors and markets, as opposed to
the victims of any fraud that somehow touches the United States." Robinson, 117 F.3d
at 906.
286. See Robinson, 117 F.3d at 906-07; see also supra notes 133-49 and
accompanying text (discussing the restrictive approach).
287. Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119
S. Ct. 890 (1999).
288. See id. at 667.
289. See id. at 661.
290. See id. Although incorporated in the Caribbean island nation of Nevis, the
company had its principal place of business in Fort Wayne, Indiana. See id.
291. See id. at 662.

718

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 30

federal court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction.2 92 For instance,
the defendants prepared documents with misrepresentations and
material omissions in the United States and then sent the documents to
the plaintiff in Malaysia.293
Although there was no effect on American investors or securities
markets and the fraudulent transaction only affected the Malaysian
the Seventh Circuit used the conduct analysis to
corporation, 294heSvn
conclude that the district court did have subject matter jurisdiction over
the case.2 95 Observing that neither the language nor the legislative
history of the Exchange Act offer much guidance,2 96 the Seventh
Circuit immediately distinguished itself from other courts by noting
that the term "test," as used in previous cases discussing the conduct
analysis, was "too inflexible a term" to describe the current status of
the law. 297 The term "test" is problematic because it indicates that there
are accepted canons of statutory interpretation that courts consistently
apply to transnational securities fraud cases.2 98 In lieu of the term
"test," the Seventh Circuit adopted the term "approach" to describe the
current status of the law because it was a more flexible term.299
Noting the circuit split,3 °° the Kauthar court remarked that the
disparity among the circuits involved both doctrinal and attitudinal
disagreements. 3 ' The Seventh Circuit recognized that Congress did
292. Id. at 667. The district court dismissed the securities fraud counts for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. See id. at 663. The district court decided that neither the
"effects" approach nor the "conduct" approach allowed it to hear the case. See id; supra
notes 88-123 and accompanying text (discussing the details of the effects and conduct
approaches).
293. See Kauthar, 149 F.3d at 667.
294. See supra notes 88-108 and accompanying text (discussing the effects approach
to determine subject matter jurisdiction in transnational securities fraud cases).
295. See Kauthar, 149 F.3d at 667.
296. See id. at 664.
297. See id. at 665.
298. See id. at 664-65.
299. See id. at 665. Twenty years before the Seventh Circuit's observation, one
commentator suggested that the term "test" oversimplifies the methods of determining
subject matter jurisdiction in transnational securities fraud cases. See Schiro, supra note
86, at 286 n.46 (stating that the term "test" does not entail "a process of matching new
facts to an old paradigm of effect or conduct").
300. See Kauthar, 149 F.3d at 665.
301. See id. The Seventh Circuit made a threefold distinction among the possible
approaches to a conduct analysis. See id. at 665-66. The Fifth Circuit expressly
repudiated the threefold distinction proposed by the Seventh Circuit. See Robinson v.
TCIIUS W. Communications Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 906 n.10 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating that
the D.C. Circuit's opinion on transnational jurisdiction over securities fraud cases
"cannot reasonably be read to have fashioned a new rule" that is more restrictive than the
Second Circuit). The Seventh Circuit noted the Fifth Circuit's disagreement. See
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not intend for the United States to become a haven for people to
commit fraud on investors in other countries, but it warned that federal
courts should guard against granting unfettered jurisdiction to cases
involving transnational securities matters under the antifraud
statutes. °2 Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit adopted the Second and
Fifth Circuit standards since those circuits seemed to balance the
competing interests of the Securities Act and the limited jurisdiction of
courts.303 Thus, the Seventh Circuit articulated the balancing approach

and its elements. 3°4 Using the balancing approach, the Seventh Circuit
specifically required that the conduct, which occurred in the United
States and allegedly violated the federal securities laws, constitute a
"substantial part" of the fraud and be material to its success.30 5
IV. ANALYSIS

There are three basic considerations facing the adoption of any
conduct test: constitutional limitations on federal jurisdiction,30 6
principles of international law,30 7 and policies underlying the federal
securities laws.3 °8 The broader conduct approach, formulated by the
Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, best complies with the letter and
spirit of the federal securities laws.3°9
Critics of the broader approach claim that such an interpretation
exceeds the limited jurisdiction conferred upon federal courts by
Congress.3"0 A broader interpretation potentially opens the door to
foreign plaintiffs who have no right to use the "precious resources of
Kauthar, 149 F.3d at 665-66 n.10. The Seventh Circuit, however, proceeded to utilize
the distinction in its analysis of subject matter jurisdiction over transnational securities
fraud cases. See id. at 665-66.
302. See Kauthar, 149 F.3d at 667.
303. See id. The court held that the district court did have subject matter jurisdiction
over the fraud claim. See id.
304. See id.
305. See id.; see also supra notes 110-23, 223-55 and accompanying text (discussing
the development of the balancing approach in the Second Circuit).
306. See supra notes 45-56 and accompanying text (discussing the limited
jurisdiction of the federal judiciary).
307. See supra notes 64-72 and accompanying text (discussing the presumption
against extraterritoriality and international comity).
308. See supra notes 82-123 and accompanying text (discussing the extraterritorial
reach of jurisdiction under the Exchange Act).
309. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text (discussing the remedial purposes
of the Exchange Act).
310. See Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(arguing that the consequences of the broader approach is a "loosening" of jurisdictional
requirements).
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United States courts."3 1 ' Critics attest that if obtaining subject matter

jurisdiction over predominantly foreign transactions is too easy, then
foreign investors may fear conducting business in the United States
since they may not want to
risk violating stringent United States
12
mistake.
by
laws
securities
Despite these criticisms, however, the broader approach does not
violate the limits of federal jurisdiction because Congress can regulate
activity that occurs within the United States but has an extraterritorial
effect.3" 3 In fact, the broader approach appears to fulfill the
jurisdictional provisions better than either the restrictive approach or
the balancing approach, particularly in light of the breadth of the
antifraud provision of the Exchange Act.3 14 The restrictive and
balancing approaches both base their positions on a confusing mix of
procedural and substantive law under the auspices of judicial
economy.3 15

The major flaw with these less liberal approaches is that they require
a plaintiff to prove too much before entering court. Under the
restrictive approach, a plaintiff must prove that all of the elements of
the securities fraud claim occurred in the United States.3 16 Similarly,
under the balancing approach, proof of subject matter jurisdiction is so
fact intensive that needless jurisdictional tests emerge.3" 7 The
31 1. Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 1995).
31 2. See Kellye Y. Testy, Comity and Cooperation: Securities Regulation in a Global
Marketplace, 45 ALA. L. REV. 927, 935 (1994).

313. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text (discussing the presumption
against extraterritoriality).
3 14. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text (discussing the remedial purposes
of the federal securities laws).
315.

See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cir. 1975).

Judge

Friendly wrote:
When, as here, a court is confronted with transactions that on any view are
predominantly foreign, it must seek to determine whether Congress would
have wished the precious resources of United States courts and law enforcement
agencies to be devoted to them rather than leave the problem to foreign
countries.
Id.
316. See supra notes 133-49 and accompanying text (describing the restrictive
approach and its requirement that the domestic conduct actually violate the United States
securities laws); see also supra notes 35-44 and accompanying text (discussing the
prima facie elements of a securities fraud case).
317. See supra notes 133-49 and accompanying text (describing the restrictive
approach's critique of the balancing approach). As Justice Douglas noted: "When a
foreign corporation undertakes fraudulent action which subjects it to the jurisdiction of
our federal securities laws, nothing justifies the conclusion that only a diluted version of
those laws protects American investors." Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506,
530-31 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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balancing approach does not even provide a clear test, rather it
proposes a nebulous "approach" to the problem of determining subject
matter jurisdiction in transnational securities fraud cases."'
Although a court's jurisdiction over a disputed securities transaction
is distinguishable from the merits of the claim itself,31 9 both the
restrictive approach and the balancing approach combine the analysis
of the merits of a transnational securities fraud claim with the analysis
of the court's jurisdiction over the claim.32 ° In doing so, they
effectively violate the will of Congress by refusing to hear claims
Congress has empowered them to hear pursuant to its constitutional
authority.32 '
The usual presumption against extraterritoriality simply does not
apply to any of the various conduct analyses of subject matter
jurisdiction because the conduct over which courts seek jurisdiction is
domestic conduct, not foreign conduct.322 Requiring that a lesser
degree of the defendant's conduct occur within the United States'
borders is arguably more effective from a procedural standpoint
because it does not require a plaintiff to prove the claim before the
court hears the claim.323 Under both the restrictive approach and the
balancing approach, however, that is precisely what a plaintiff must
prove in order to bring a claim before a federal court, thereby denying
some plaintiffs of their day in court.32 4

Critics of the narrow conduct test argue that if jurisdiction is
narrowed too much, there is a danger that the United States securities
markets will become a "base of operations" for fraudulent foreign
318. See supra notes 287-305 and accompanying text (discussing the Seventh
Circuit's analysis of the conduct approach).
319. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text (describing the distinction
between the merits of a claim and a court's jurisdiction over that claim).
320.

See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.

32 1. See supra notes 45-60 (discussing congressional limits on federal subject matter
jurisdiction).
322. See supra notes 64-67, 73-81 and accompanying text (discussing the
presumption against extraterritoriality and the rebuttal of that presumption). The basis
for the presumption against extraterritoriality is that Congress focuses its concerns on
domestic rather than foreign activity. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. The
presumption against extraterritoriality does not apply to the conduct approach,
however, since the conduct involved actually occurs within the United States thereby not
involving foreign activity.

See supra note 117 and accompanying text.

323. See supra notes 150-213 and accompanying text (discussing the broader conduct
approach and its requirement that only some conduct in the United States is sufficient to
confer jurisdiction in the United States).
324. See supra notes 133-49 and accompanying text (discussing the restrictive
conduct approach); supra notes 214-305 and accompanying text (discussing the
balancing approach).
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securities transactions.325 Congress is concerned even when the
fraudulent securities devices are directed towards foreigners because it
is doubtful that they intended the United States to be used as a base of
operations for securities fraud directed at investors in other
countries.326 Furthermore, if American investors want to rely on the
protections of the investment laws of other countries, American laws
must protect foreign investors.327 Preventing the United States from
becoming a base of operations for securities fraud becomes
3 28
increasingly intolerable as the global financial community grows,
particularly as new modes of communication emerge, increasing
access to United States markets and investors.329
The fundamental difference among the approaches comes down to
policy considerations. 330 The broader approach places a heavier
emphasis on policy considerations. 331' The balancing approach
325. See SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir. 1977).
326. See lIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017 (2d Cir. 1975).
327. See supra notes 172-82, 194-98, 205-09 and accompanying text (discussing the
policy considerations invoked by adherents of the broader approach).
328. See Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 667 (7th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 890 (1999) (stating that "we live in an increasingly global financial
community").
329. See Statement of the Commission Regarding Use of Internet Web Sites to Offer
Securities, Solicit Securities Transactions or Advertise Investment Services Offshore,
1998 SEC LEXIS 488, 63 F.R. 14806 (March 23, 1998) (discussing the SEC's views on
the use of web sites to disseminate offering and solicitation materials for offshore sales
of securities); see also Jack L. Goldsmith, The Internet and the Abiding Significance of
Territorial Sovereignty, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL L. STUD. 475 (1998) (arguing that territorial
regulation is the dominant way to regulate transnational transactions); Robert A.
Prentice, The Future of Corporate Disclosure: The Internet, Securities Fraud,and Rule
10b-5, 47 EMORY L.J. 1 (1998) (analyzing the impact of the Internet on regulating
securities fraud). A recent SEC suit against 44 scam artists, who used the Internet to
implement fraudulent schemes against unwary investors, highlighted the dangers posed
by new media such as computers. See Michael Schroeder & Rebecca Buckman, U.S.
Attacks Stock Fraudon Internet: SEC Hits Promoters Touting Small Issues, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 29, 1998, at Cl. According to the SEC, the types of fraud involved were not novel
although a new medium was used to execute the fraud. See id. Some observers noted that
the Internet, as a medium of fraud, poses a more novel and difficult problem than the SEC
is currently willing to acknowledge. See Jason Anders & Carrie Lee, SEC Actions
Underscore the Dangers But Won't Safeguard Online Investors, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2,
1998, at A3 lB. The difficulties in policing the Internet for fraud are novel because many
investors think they can make a quick buck through online investment services. See id.
Furthermore, the "veil of anonymity," which is inherent to web site operations, aids
swindlers in their schemes to defraud investors. See id.
330. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text (discussing the restrictive
approach's rejection of policy considerations); see also supra notes 172-82 and
accompanying text (discussing the broader approach's acceptance of policy
considerations)
331. See supra notes 172-82, 194-98, 205-09 and accompanying text (discussing
policy concerns such as preventing defrauders from using the United States as a base of
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acknowledges those considerations, but its adherents seem more
concerned with preserving the "precious resources" of the federal
courts than with hearing legitimate claims.332 Furthermore, the fact
intensive inquiry proposed by adherents of the balancing approach
blurs the distinction between the procedural elements of a claim and its
merits.3 33 Consequently, the broader approach provides the clearest
procedural framework for determining subject matter jurisdiction in
transnational securities fraud cases.
V. PROPOSAL

Courts should adopt the broader conduct approach in determining
whether they have subject matter jurisdiction to hear a transnational
securities fraud case.33 4 Given that clear standards are necessary to
determine the types of conduct that will make a court competent to hear
a transnational securities fraud claim, 335 the Supreme Court should
take the opportunity to reconcile this circuit split. When it does, the
Supreme Court should adopt the broader conduct approach on the
basis that it complies with the Constitution, principles of international
law, and the policies underlying the federal securities law.336
The broader approach, as proposed by the Third, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits, will provide the simplest and clearest jurisdictional standard
since the restrictive approach is too narrow and the balancing approach
is too ambiguous. 337 Although the restrictive approach would also
provide a clear standard, it would bar many litigants whose claims
deserve to be heard on the merits because the restrictive approach
excludes many cases that would be allowed under both the broader or
operations, encouraging reciprocity by other countries, and encouraging business ethics
in the United States).
332. See supra note 235 and accompanying text (discussing the need to preserve
judicial resources when foreign transactions are in dispute).
333. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text (discussing the difference
between the merits of a case and subject matter jurisdiction).
334. Thus, this Comment reaches the conclusion drawn by the Third Circuit, when it
stated: "We are reluctant to conclude that Congress intended to allow the United States
to become a 'Barbary Coast,' as it were, harboring international securities 'pirates.'"
SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir. 1977).
335. See supra notes 306-33 and accompanying text (discussing the need for clarity
of procedural standards).
336. See supra notes 306-33 and accompanying text (comparing the different
approaches adopted by the circuit courts).
337. See supra notes 150-213 and accompanying text (discussing the broader conduct
approach); see also Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 36-37 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (Wald, C.J., concurring); Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421, 424 (9th Cir.
1983); Continental Grain (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 415
(8th Cir. 1979); SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 115 (3d Cir. 1977).
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even the balancing approach. 33' Furthermore, under the restrictive
approach, plaintiffs would have to prove their cases on the merits
before establishing that there are sufficient facts to support
jurisdiction. 339 Thus, the restrictive approach would deny deserving
advocate a parochial
litigants of their day in court in order to
34
federalism, which opposes judicial activism.
The broader approach will provide clearer procedural standards than
the balancing approach due to the balancing approach's fact-intensive
inquiry. 341 Due to the factual burden required by the balancing
approach, it would provide an unclear procedural standard, which
would needlessly multiply the jurisdictional standards at issue in
transnational securities cases.342

The Seventh Circuit's adoption of the term "approach" in lieu of
"test" to analyze conduct highlights the fact that the balancing approach
would prevent courts from establishing clear procedural standards.343
Thus, the balancing approach, like the restrictive approach, would blur
the distinction between the merits of a case and the competency of a
federal court to hear a case.

The broader approach would better serve the remedial purposes of
securities legislation, which the restrictive and balancing approaches
sacrifice for the sake of judicial economy.3 45 The resources of the
federal judiciary may be "precious"; however, judicial economy should
not be invoked if litigants with legitimate claims would be denied
access to federal courts.3 46 When considering which type of conduct

analysis to adopt in transnational securities cases, policy
considerations should play a large role in order to implement the

338. See supra notes 133-49 and accompanying text (discussing the restrictive
approach's exclusion of legitimate litigants).
339. See supra notes 316-18 and accompanying text (criticizing the restrictive
approach's requirement that plaintiffs prove the merits of their case before establishing
jurisdiction).
340. See supra notes 306-33 and accompanying text (examining the limited
applicability and scope of the restrictive approach).
341. See supra notes 306-33 (discussing the lack of a test for determining subject
matter jurisdiction when using the balancing approach).
342. See supra notes 306-33 and accompanying text.
343. See Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 665 (7th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 119 S.Ct. 890 (1999).
344. See supra notes 306-33 and accompanying text (comparing the three
approaches of conduct analysis).
345. See supra notes 306-33 and accompanying text.
346. See supra notes 306-33 and accompanying text (analyzing the broader
approach).
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remedial purposes of the securities laws.34 7

The primary concerns with adopting the broader approach are the
limits on federal jurisdiction, the presumption against
extraterritoriality, and principles of international comity. 348 Despite
these concerns, a broader reading of the jurisdictional grant under the
Exchange Act is appropriate in transnational securities fraud cases.
First, the broader approach does not exceed the limits imposed by the
Constitution.3 49 Second, the broader approach does not exceed the
jurisdictional grant given by Congress. 350 Accordingly, courts could
not exceed the Constitutional limits to their jurisdiction; 35 1 however,
they could review federal law and determine the scope of a given
statutory provision, including provisions bestowing jurisdiction upon
the federal judiciary.35 2
Finally, adoption of the broader analysis of the conduct approach
does not violate the presumption against extraterritoriality or principles
of international comity. 353 The presumption against extraterritoriality
does not apply to any of the conduct analyses because the courts
would rule on activity conducted within United States borders, not
outside domestic borders.354 International comity becomes an issue
only if a conflict arises with regard to another country's ability to
adjudicate the transaction.3 55 However, principles of comity would
not be violated simply because a litigant might be subject to the laws of
two different nations because two countries can both legitimately
exercise jurisdiction over the same transaction.356 Principles of
347. See SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir. 1977).
348. See supra notes 306-33 and accompanying text.
349. See supra notes 150-213 and accompanying text (discussing the broader
approach's adherence to the text of the United States Constitution).
350. See supra notes 150-213 and accompanying text (examining the broader
conduct approach as it fits with the scope of the Exchange Act).
35 1. See supra notes 45-60 and accompanying text (reviewing the limits of federal
jurisdiction).
352. See supra notes 45-60 and accompanying text (noting that the scope of any
given statutory provision is limited by federal jurisdiction).
353. See supra notes 306-33 and accompanying text (indicating that the presumption
against extraterritoriality would not limit use of the broader analysis of domestic
conduct).
354. See supra notes 306-33 and accompanying text (analyzing the broader
approach).
355. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text (discussing principles of
international comity).
356. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text. This is analogous to the socalled "subjective territorial principle," which would allow two different sovereigns to
adjudicate the same wrongdoing, such as shooting a bullet across state lines. See supra
note 173 (discussing the subjective territorial principle).
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international comity do not impose any absolute obligations on courts
to deny jurisdiction
since comity concerns are a matter of courtesy and
35 7
good will.

VI. CONCLUSION

In transnational securities fraud cases, a broader conduct analysis of
subject matter jurisdiction should be adopted because a broader
analysis provides the clearest procedural standards and comports with
the remedial purposes of the federal securities laws. Providing a
broader exercise of subject matter jurisdiction over transnational
securities transactions neither exceeds the constitutional limits of
federal jurisdiction nor violates principles of international comity.
Broadly interpreting the jurisdictional provisions of the Exchange Act
also allows victims of transnational securities fraud to have access to
federal courts without having to prove the merits of their claims first.
Consequently, a broader analysis of subject matter jurisdiction over
transnational securities fraud will preserve the broad antifraud
protections provided in the Exchange Act by preventing the United
States from becoming a safe harbor for international scam artists
attempting to defraud investors in other countries.
MICHAEL J. CALHOUN

357. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.

